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ABSTRACT  
Prior works in the social sciences have demonstrated the importance that television can 
have in shaping the views and outlooks of viewers. Studies have examined how it is that overtly 
political broadcasting, such as political commercials or ideological cable news channels, can 
impact viewers. However, precious little scholarship in the field of political science has been 
devoted to examining how non-news programming, the lion’s share of what is shown on 
television, can shape and mold viewers’ outlooks and opinions. Television programming is often 
built around conflict, presenting a distorted view of the world wherein certain “in-groups,” 
mainly the assumed audience of the broadcast, are invited to ridicule or feel hostility towards 
certain “out-groups.” It is hypothesized that non-news programming can influence how 
television viewers feel toward the “out-groups” targeted for ridicule or exclusion in their 
broadcasts. 
 In order to test this hypothesis, both statistical analysis of pre-assembled data and an 
experimental design will be utilized. Cross-sectional data assembled by GSS and Annenberg will 
be analyzed using logit and ordinary least square models. Controlling for the socio-demographic, 
partisan, and ideological characteristics of a typical viewer of late-night satirical broadcasting or 
religious broadcasting, it is demonstrated that increased viewing of these types of television 
programs is significantly correlated with increased antipathy toward the “out-groups” or public 
figures held up for scorn or ridicule during these programs.  
 The experimental design involves an online survey where respondents answered a series 
of questions pertaining to their political views, political knowledge, and socio-demographic 
characteristics. Respondents were then randomly selected to be exposed to one of three video 
clips, one of religious broadcasting discussing California’s Proposition 8, one of satirical 
broadcasting discussing California’s Proposition 8, and a sample of network news discussing the 
same issue. A post-screening questionnaire regarding feelings towards targeted out-groups was 
then administered to the subjects. Exposure non-news television programming increased 
antipathy toward the “out-groups” targeted for hostility or ridicule within the television clips. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
Americans watch more TV than the citizens of any other nation in the world (Gilson 
2009). There are more television sets in the United States than toilets (American Psychological 
Association 1993; Bushman 2005). Like many other forms of media, television satisfies a myriad 
of needs and wants (Abelman 1987; Katz, Blumler and Gurevitch 1974). Of particular interest to 
political scientists, one of the needs satisfied by television is the need for information, including 
political information. Eighty percent of respondents in a recent survey in the United States 
replied that they regularly watch television news programs (Chen and Suen 2008), “and adults 
spend significantly more time with television than with any other medium” (Bushman 2005; 702; 
Television Bureau of Advertising 2003). While there is a substantial body of work exploring the 
influence that television news, political programming, and campaign advertising can have on 
those exposed to its messages, there is comparatively little work on the influence that non-news 
television programming can have on television viewers. 
Non-news television broadcasts can present the world in an “us vs. them” manner, where 
certain out-groups are targets for ridicule or hostility (Bruce 1990; Carr 1992; Hughey 1990; 
Straub 1988).  This presentation can influence how viewers of these programs feel toward those 
targeted out-groups. Using the case studies of religious television programming and satirical 
television programming, this work seeks to demonstrate how television programs can shape 
opinions towards targeted out-groups. Furthermore, this work discusses the potential political 
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ramifications of this effect. Religious and satirical programs were selected as case studies 
because of the popularity of both forms of programming and their relevance to the field of 
political science.  Both forms of television media frequently carry disguised political messages, 
masked as pure entertainment in the case of satirical programs or spiritually uplifting messages 
in the case of religious programming, another compelling reason for the use of religious and 
satirical media as case studies.  
Viewers of religious programming presumably seek to satisfy some spiritual desire, 
rather than to obtain political news. "The sermons, the preaching, the music, the experience of 
‘having your spirits lifted’ and ‘feeling close to God’ are frequently expressed satisfactions that 
viewers derive from religious programs" (Gerbner et al. 1984; 4). Similarly, the viewers of The 
Daily Show with Jon Stewart1, Late Night with David Letterman or The Tonight Show with Jay 
Leno presumably seek entertainment. However, both religious program viewers and satirical 
program viewers may find their political attitudes and beliefs being shaped, even when they may 
not have intended to gain any sort of political information from the program they are watching. 
Due to their interest in receiving the messages of the program they are watching, viewers are 
susceptible to receiving and processing the political messages that are being transmitted within 
the satirical or religious context of the program (Zaller 1992).  
 Baum and Jamison (2006) argue that political content, when presented in an 
“entertaining context,” can be “piggybacked (i.e., attached) to information intended primarily to 
entertain, and hence consumed incidentally,” thus allowing ostensibly apolitical programming to 
inform those viewers who have low levels of interest in politics and low levels of knowledge of 
politics (Baum and Jamison 2006; 948). This work affirms Baum and Jamison in that 
                                                 
1
 Hereafter referred to as The Daily Show for the sake of brevity. 
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programming designed to be consumed by those not seeking political information can, in fact, 
inform viewers. Baum and Jamison (2006) conclude by implying that low-information voters 
utilize “soft news” sources, such as daytime talk shows, to provide them with the information 
that they need in order to make informed decisions. This work takes a different direction from 
Baum and Jamison (2006) by arguing that political views and attitudes can be transmitted 
through programming that presents itself as serving a primary role other than that of supplying 
political information and to audiences who are not necessarily seeking political information. 
Previous academic work has discussed the impact of television (McLuhan 1964; Mutz 
and Reeves 2005; Robinson 1976) as well as the impact print and television media has upon 
those who receive mass media messages (Bartels 1993; Lippman 1922; McCombs and Shaw 
1972; Mutz 1998; Noelle-Neuman 1974; Zaller 1992; Zaller 1996). This work will build upon 
these sources as well as the present literature that discusses media effects from overtly political 
sources (Goldstein and Freedman 2002; Groseclose 2011; Freedman and Goldstein 1999; 
Valentino et al. 2008).  This dissertation also will add to the extant scholarship that has sought to 
empirically demonstrate that, broadly speaking, media matters. This dissertation then will 
diverge from much of the existing literature by addressing the impact that political information 
has upon the political outlooks and attitudes of those who receive its messages when the 
information is being transmitted through what shall be referred to in this work as non-news 
sources.  Non-news sources refers to television programs that are not “news programs” in the 
traditional sense, and are not broadcast on cable news networks, that nonetheless present political 
content with consistent, specific framing and priming. Consistent, specific framing and priming, 
means that these media sources do not generally diverge from how they present their chosen out-
groups and in-groups. Today’s enemy is not going to be tomorrow’s friend. Non-news sources 
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have set, distinct ideological and social views of the world, and these views are transmitted to 
their audiences within a television format that is salient to their audience. While non-traditional 
news sources can take many forms, the case studies are religious television and satirical 
television, which were chosen because of their popularity, their relevance to political science, 
and their systematic targeting of out-groups for scorn or condemnation.  
The following statistics detail the popularity of religious and satirical television, as well 
as their relevance to political science. Conservative estimates of viewership for religious 
television place it around 15-20 million Americans per week (Bruce 1990; Green 1992; Hoover 
1987). Much of the literature exploring religious television is from the heyday of televangelists 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including work describing Pat Robertson’s run for the 
Republican nomination for President in 1988. Satirical media has been seemingly rediscovered 
by the academy due to the rise in popularity of The Daily Show and The Colbert Report.  The 
Pew Research Center 2012 Biennial Media Consumption Study states that approximately 26% of 
the American public watched The Daily Show “at least sometimes” and 23% said the same about 
The Colbert Report (Forgette, Morris and Russo 2013, Pew 2012).  As will be explored later, 
both forms of television repeatedly target particular social out-groups for ridicule, derision or 
condemnation (Baumgartner and Morris 2006; Bruce 1990; Hughey 1990; Straub 1988). Prior 
works have explored how framing and priming takes place within the context of television. 
Television Effects 
With the rise of the 24-hour news cycle and ideologically driven cable news outlets, 
political scientists are increasingly interested in how television news outlets politically frame 
stories and prime their viewers. For example, academic studies validated the conventional 
wisdom and empirically demonstrated that Fox News presents content significantly to the right 
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of other mainstream television news sources (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Groseclose and 
Milyo 2005). Building from these studies, researchers have also demonstrated that the public’s 
perceptions on political matters can be and are affected by the ideological content of the news 
media messages that viewers consume (Groseclose 2011). Martin (2008) and Mutz (1998) 
demonstrated that media also subtly influences politics by "…informing beliefs about social 
reality that in turn shape political attitudes and behavior" (Martin 2008; 181). Thus, media can 
cause viewers to change their political beliefs and attitudes by directly appealing to political 
ideology, (e.g., the policies of Party X are bad for America), or in less direct ways. A subtle 
approach to influencing the public could include choosing the issues on which a television news 
program will focus. How a news program reports the issues is another less direct method of 
influencing the viewers’ attitudes (Ebring, Goldenberg and Miller 1980; McCombs and Shaw 
1972). This work contends that non-news sources also influence the political beliefs and attitudes 
of their viewers.  
In a discussion about any form of media, it is necessary to pay attention to the consumers 
of that media. All television viewers are not created equal. Viewers’ attitudes and experiences 
can shape the way they interpret media messages (Sharp and Joslyn 2001). Case in point, 
viewers of differing levels of political sophistication will be affected in different ways by what 
they see on television (Bartels 1993; Zaller 1992; 1996). Viewers who do not already have 
coherent political ideologies or sufficient prior knowledge of political affairs and events do not 
have the necessary political maturity to mount a defense to the sophisticated arguments being 
presented to them on television by news sources (Campbell et al. 1960; Price and Zaller 1993; 
Zaller 1992; 1996). Following this logic, this research shows that non-news sources can mold 
and shape the perceptions of viewers because their messages are not overt. It is further argued 
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that even sophisticated viewers may have their guard lowered and thus be ripe for media 
manipulation when they are exposed to political content in non-news sources. Non-news sources 
also reach the large numbers of Americans who are politically uninformed and unsophisticated, 
and, voluntarily or otherwise, do not expose themselves to news or televised political 
programming. “The most common mechanisms by which voters are purportedly able to resist 
dissonant media messages--such as selective reception, attention and retention (Campbell et al. 
1960)--may simply be less applicable to (entertainment) talk shows, at least for low-awareness 
voters” (Baum 2005; 231). 
 In the same vein, Robinson (1976) and other proponents of the “videomalaise” theory 
mention the case of accidental news viewers. Videomalaise, a theory initially advanced by 
scholars such as Robinson (1976) and Dahl (1967), suggests that increased exposure to television 
journalism, or even just television itself, has a detrimental effect on the "national political ethos” 
(Robinson 1976; 411). By being bombarded with negative television news reports, television 
viewers grow increasingly distrustful of established political and social institutions. Additionally, 
they grow increasingly skeptical and cynical as they continually consume the kind of conflict-
driven, sensationalized news stories that television readily offers. Robinson (1976) particularly 
feared that viewers who lacked political sophistication would be a kind of collateral damage of 
the media messages disseminated by television news programs. To Robinson, viewers with 
limited exposure to television news are accidental viewers who are too politically 
unsophisticated to properly process the news. Consequently, they become TV casualties--cynical 
and fearful. Videomalaise theory highlights why this research project is focusing on television to 
the exclusion of other forms of media (i.e., newspapers, the internet, etc.) Videomalaise theory 
also offers reasons why bombardment by television programming results in mostly negative 
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changes in views towards specific political figures and social groups. Robinson (1976) and 
others have highlighted how television focuses on conflict and how it presents a distorted, more 
intense, and more aggressive version of reality than exists outside of the small screen (Forgette 
and Morris 2006; Martin 2008; Mutz 2007; Mutz and Reeves 2005). Not only is there an overall 
media effect, but television has a singularly negative impact on the outlooks and attitudes of 
viewers. 
Religious Media: An Overview 
Do the viewers of religious broadcasting differ not only from the general population, but 
also from other religious Americans? In what way should consumers of religious media be 
expected to differ? On one hand, there is an overt “us vs. them” mindset to the theology of many  
religious broadcasters. Those who tune in are “saved,” but the rest of society is not. Specific out-
groups in society are often targeted for ridicule and scorn, such as homosexuals and atheists 
(Straub 1988). When this theology is coupled with the confrontational nature of television itself 
(Forgette and Morris 2006; Robinson 1975; Robinson 1976), it is expected that consumers of 
religious media should be more hostile to targeted out-groups than those who do not consume 
religious media. These results should hold even when controlling for the conservatism or 
religiosity of the consumer. 
Campbell (2006) argued that evangelical Christians see themselves as living in a distinct 
society within society. Assuming that much of this feeling of intra-societal alienation derives 
from their religious conservatism--which considers contemporary secular American society to be 
strewn with sinfulness--it follows that one may think consumers of religious media would feel 
similar disassociation from society. After all, religious television is often evangelical or 
conservative in its theology. This disassociation also stems from many fundamentalist and 
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evangelical Christians subscribing to a theological outlook known as premillennialism.  This 
belief holds that the world must deteriorate into sinfulness until an Anti-Christ takes power over 
the Earth, whereupon Christ will return to Earth as king.  Christ will then summon the faithful in 
what is known as the Rapture.  A millennium of tribulations will then ravage the world before 
Christ will return to vanquish the Anti-Christ (Wilcox 2000). Wilcox goes on to explain the 
impact this worldview has on political efficacy: 
“If…the world must inevitably worsen until Christ rescues his followers, then politics is a 
futile endeavor. Moreover, if Christ might come again at any moment and summon the pure to 
him, then the top priority for Christian must be to remain distinct from the sinful world to avoid 
temptation. Political involvement might lead to compromise with sin, which would leave the 
Christian unready for the trumpet call that would signal the second coming. The fundamentalist 
acceptance of premillennialism therefore created a strong resistance to political involvement…” 
(27) 
This resultant disassociation from political affairs can lead to a disinterest and mistrust in 
the operations of the nation’s political institutions and decreased political efficacy (Scheufele, 
Nisbet and Brossard 2003). 
However, the electronic church, in keeping with its revivalist roots, is often overtly 
political (Abelman and Neyendorf 1987; Hadden 1987). Issues of the day may be discussed in 
the context of sermons held up as examples of America’s sinfulness or presented in formats 
similar to the evening news (Abelman 1987; Straub 1988). It is proposed in this dissertation that 
consumers of religious television are particularly susceptible to having their political outlooks 
and opinions molded. By presenting political messages in a format or context that is more 
attractive and salient to the viewer than a typical news broadcast, religious television can 
influence an audience that might otherwise ignore traditional political coverage. Importantly, this 
religious information is being disseminated, not from the pulpit, but from the television. Keeping 
in mind McLuhan’s observation that “the medium is the message” (1964), it should be expected 
that a televised religious broadcast would have an effect upon the audience distinct from that of a 
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live religious sermon. This expectation ties in with extant literature’s explorations into the unique 
impact of television itself (Forgette and Morris 2006; Martin 2008; McLuhan 1964; Mutz and 
Reeves 2005; Robinson 1976). The present work builds upon previous scholarship in the 
videomalaise school by suggesting that religious television has a confrontational component that 
is partially a product of the nature of the medium itself, and partially a product of the content of 
the messages being delivered by the television preachers.  
It is expected that consumers of religious media have a more exclusionary, conservative 
worldview than other segments of society with respect to certain out-groups.  Academic work 
that has performed content analysis of religious television has not been conducted in over two 
decades. While the following information may be considered outdated, the most popular 
televangelists of the late 1980s, including Jimmy Swaggert, Jim Bakker and Pat Robertson, 
devoted the largest sections of their time to covering political or social issues, as opposed to 
strictly religious issues (Abelman and Neuendorf 1987). It also bears mentioning that the trend 
was one where the blocks of time on their programs devoted to social or political issues, as 
opposed to religious issues, were on the increase as Abelman and Neuendorf’s period of analysis 
concluded.  In terms of distinct content on television, as opposed to coming from the pulpit, 
Abelman and Neuendorf (1987) also note the praise that televangelists had for the medium of 
television and the mass media itself: 
“One of the most interesting findings, given the fact that mass media are common targets 
of political and social leaders, was that mass media were one of the few topics readily approved 
of by discussants in these programs. It is possible, however, that this is not necessarily a view 
generally held in religious circles, but rather an artifact of the media-dependence of electronic 
ministries” (164). 
 
Televangelists thus seem to readily support the marriage between the old revival culture 
and the new method of delivering the message. 
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Satirical Media: An Overview 
While political satire is hardly a new phenomenon, political science literature has 
remained mostly silent on the subject until recently. Even as studies examined the impact of the 
medium of television on the political views, efficacy, and behavior of the American populace, 
few political scientists took notice of satirical programming such as Saturday Night Live and its 
“Weekend Update” segment or the anti-establishment ethos behind The Smothers Brothers (Carr 
1992).  However, the popularity of the Comedy Central program, The Daily Show, among 
younger, more affluent, and college-educated Americans has helped spearhead a rediscovery of 
academic interest in political satire’s potential to shape the views and behavior of its audience. 
Late-night comedy shows tend to devote significant time and attention to political commentary, 
which has sparked interest of late within the political communication literature to satirical media 
(Baumgartner and Morris 2006; Fox et al. 2007; Holbert et al. 2007; LaMarre et al. 2009; 
Landreville, Holbert and LaMarre 2010; Moy et al. 2005, 2006; Young 2004; Young and 
Tisinger 2006).  This rediscovery of satirical media has not been wholly confined to the left-
leaning The Daily Show. Studies on late night talk shows in general also have begun to appear in 
academic journals, often providing some illuminating findings (Moy, Xenos and Hess 2005; 
Parkin 2010) Additionally, recent works demonstrate how younger Americans seem to learn 
substantive political issues better through comedic programming than through “straight news” 
programming (Parkin 2010). The ability of comedic programs to inform, as well as entertain, 
lends further credence to Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample (R-A-S) model.  The R-A-S model 
proposes that viewers’ level of engagement is determinative of whether or not they will 
“receive,” or be able to understand and retain, a given message. If that message is able to fit in 
with the viewers’ previously held opinions or outlooks, they are likely to “accept” the message. 
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When then asked their opinion about an issue, viewers will “sample” the opinions that have most 
recently been “received” and “accepted.” By tuning in to a program that seems relevant to their 
interests, such as the comedic Late Night with David Letterman, younger viewers are not only 
receptive to what is being broadcast but likely to accept and store the messages that they are 
receiving (Zaller 1992). 
 Countering the prior convention that candidate appearances on entertainment programs 
would lead viewers to focus on superficial issues, Parkin (2010) was found that viewers of late 
night comedy programs could actually “become cognizant and knowledgeable of key issues in 
the campaign” (4), and, it was found that many viewers learn more about substantive political 
issues through this “entertaining medium” rather than through “straight news.” As Parkin (2010) 
concludes, “the entertaining aspects of unconventional news sources can have a real impact on 
what people know about politics and how they make their decisions” (13). This finding was 
particularly true among younger Americans. For younger viewers, the “entertaining context” of 
John Kerry’s appearance on David Letterman, even presented as a transcript rather than a video 
clip, caused increased interest toward substantive political issues (Parkin 2010).  
This rediscovery of satirical television may stem from the generational divide in the 
consumption of, and trust in, satirical television.  Landreville, Holbert and LaMarre (2010) make 
note of the results of a 2008 Pew Research Center survey wherein 27 percent of respondents 
aged eighteen-to-twenty-nine reported “sometimes” learning about the 2008 presidential 
campaign from comedy shows. By way of comparison, only 14 percent of respondents over fifty 
reported in kind (Landreville, Holbert and LaMarre 2010). This study was not unique in 
demonstrating the influence that satirical and humorous broadcasts can have on young 
Americans (Cao 2008; Hart and Hartelius 2007; Hollander 2005). As Carr (1992) proposes, 
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satirical media also often presents distinct in-group/out-group divides, wherein select out-groups 
are targets for mocking and ridicule. 
 
Expectations 
 How do these forms of television affect the viewing public? The central assertion of this 
study is that exposure to non-news sources can influence the views and attitudes of the viewer. 
The present study will focus specifically on the theory that exposure to non-news sources leads 
the viewer to hold negative attitudes toward the out-groups targeted by that non-news source. In 
order to test this assertion, I will utilize both analysis of pre-existing datasets and an 
experimental design. In the experimental design, subjects will be exposed to religious television 
and satirical television. It is expected that exposure to these visual materials will lead viewers to 
hold stronger antipathy towards the out-groups mentioned in the visual materials when compared 
with the attitudes towards those same groups among those not exposed to the visual materials. It 
is also expected that this antipathy will remain statistically significant even when controls for 
political ideology, partisanship, and relevant socio-demographic characteristics are included in 
the model. The following table outlines the predicted results of the project’s experimental design 
component. It is anticipated that exposure to the two forms of non-news will be correlated with 
stronger negative feelings toward the out-groups targeted in those clips. Due to the divisive, 
negative, conflict-laden nature of television broadcasts, it is not expected that exposure to visual 
materials will lead to increased positive attitudes towards the corresponding in-group for either 
religious media or satirical media. Representing Parkin (2010)’s “straight news,” a local news 
broadcast will be used as the control treatment. 
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Table 1.1 Expected Results 
Visual Materials to which 
Respondents are Exposed 
Respondents’ Attitudes Towards Targeted Out-Groups 
Feelings Towards Left-
Leaning Groups/Individuals 
Feelings Towards Right-
Leaning Groups/Individuals 
Religious Media More Hostile No Change 
Satirical Media No Change More Hostile 
Local News No Change No Change 
 
Data and Methods  
Survey data from General Social Surveys (GSS) and Annenberg will be used in the 
statistical analysis in Chapter 4. The survey data contains questions pertaining to watching both 
satirical television (Annenberg) and religious television (GSS). Each of the surveys also asks 
questions needed to establish controls, such as questions regarding partisanship, and socio-
demographic questions. In addition to the GSS and Annenberg survey data, this research project 
will utilize an experimental design. Previous works in the field have discussed the drawbacks 
associated with using only cross-sectional data in attempting to measure media effects such as 
agenda setting (Behr and Iyengar 1985; Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982; Ladd 2009). The use of 
an experimental design addresses the shortcomings that are inherent in the use of any survey 
data, particularly when using survey data to try to measure media effects.  By complementing the 
results of survey data with an experimental design, discussed in detail in Chapter 3, this 
dissertation addresses the potential for self-selection among the respondents biasing the results. 
Similarly, the cross-sectional data statistical analysis supporting the results of the experimental 
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design shows the validity and robustness of the results in the field and outside a controlled 
experimental setting. 
The potential for self-selection by audience members is a concern in media effects 
research. It is possible that there is simply a unique subset of religious Americans, who resemble 
other religious Americans, but who hold particularly hostile opinions towards certain societal 
out-groups. These religious Americans would gravitate toward religious programming that 
reflects their worldview. The potential for self-selection biasing the results of any analysis would 
also call into question the direction of the causal arrow of this study. That is, the network 
executives and the creative forces responsible for the content of television programs may modify 
their product based on what they feel the audience wants to hear (Behr and Iyengar 1985). One 
could argue that that religious media does not affect its audience, but that a core religious 
constituency wants to hear messages that reflect their political viewpoints and so they tune in to 
programming that they feel accurately reflects their values. Producers of religious programming 
would then try to make sure that their programming accurately captures the values of their 
audience. Similarly, it is possible that those drawn to late-night comedy programs such as The 
Daily Show already have little respect for conservative public figures.  The late-night comedy 
programs could thus tailor their messages in order to appeal to the political sensibilities and 
cynical opinions of this subset of the American public.  
While this dissertation acknowledge that networks will air programs that they feel will 
attract viewers, this does not mean that the programs do not still have an impact in shaping the 
views and attitudes of their audiences. Behr and Iyengar (1985) demonstrate that news coverage 
is mostly unaffected by public opinion; further, they found no empirical support for the position 
that public sentiment influences media messages in general. However, the same study was able 
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to find substantial empirical evidence to support the claim that television news can, and does, 
influence the viewing public. More recent literature has acknowledged that, while television may 
use conflict or negativity as a kind of bait to attract the audience, media does have a real impact 
upon the viewing audience (Forgette and Morris 2006). 
Outline and Conclusion 
The second chapter of the dissertation provides the literature review and theory sections. 
An overview of literature regarding media effects precedes a more detailed looks at the two case 
studies for this dissertation: religious television and satirical television. The third chapter details 
the experimental design used to test the effect of being exposed to non-news. The fourth chapter 
analyzes large national datasets for the impact that non-news television can have on views 
towards targeted out-groups. The fifth chapter summarizes the results presented in the previous 
two chapters and then presents extensions of this research as well as the normative implications 
of its findings. 
This dissertation addresses many questions currently unexplored in existing media effects 
literature. Non-news television programs fostering of out-group hostility warrants empirical 
examination, and this dissertation makes a significant contribution to the field by addressing this 
topic in a novel manner.  This dissertation is in the vanguard of using new technology to explore 
media effects by utilizing an experimental design with respondents recruited via the new 
MechanicalTurk service offered by Amazon.com and hosted by Qualtrics.com. 
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CHAPTER II: THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This work examines the impact that non-news--media that may not be billed or presented 
as being a source of political information that nonetheless contains political messages--has on the 
attitudes and beliefs of its consumers. Using the case studies of religious television and satirical 
television, this dissertation demonstrates through the analysis of survey data and the use of an 
experimental design that non-news television shapes the views and attitudes of its audience. This 
research was conducted with the a priori assumption that media can and does shape the opinions 
of television viewers and other consumers of mass media. However, political scientists have not 
always agreed.  
There has been some debate in the field of political communications regarding just how 
much of an influence media has. The dominant view in the literature--up until the tail end of the 
Twentieth Century--was previously the minimal effects theory, which holds that media has little 
influence in shaping the beliefs or attitudes of the audience (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; 
McCombs and Shaw 1972; McGuire 1985; Neuman 1986). In describing--and ultimately 
refuting--the minimal effects theory, Bennet and Iyengar (2008) explain how minimal effects 
theory proposes that the media’s impact is diluted after being passed through a psychological 
filter created by each individual’s social networks, including “political parties, churches, unions 
and service organizations” (Bennett and Iyengar 2008; 707). Minimal effects theory has also 
been successfully countered by work demonstrating that media can and does have a real impact 
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on the views and behavior of those who consume media messages (Bartels 1993; Entman 1989; 
Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982; Iyengar and Simon 2000). 
Prior works in the field explore the question of media effects in several ways. Some 
political scientists have looked at the impact of direct attempts to influence the American public. 
For example, scholars have examined the impact that campaign commercials, negative ads, and 
other media appeals from political campaigns have on the electorate (Goldstein and Freedman 
2002; Freedman and Goldstein 1999; Niven 2006; Wattenberg and Brians 1999). Other works 
have sought a more generalizable approach by looking at how different forms of media can have 
varying degrees of impact on their audience or simply looking to see whether or not media 
messages impact the audience at all (Ebring, Goldenberg and Miller 1980; Price and Zaller 1993; 
Stroud 2008).  
Another debate that circles the media effects literature is whether or not the selective 
reception of media messages impacts the general public. Some have proposed that, since the 
viewing audience self-selects messages with which they already agree, the media ultimately 
plays a small role in influencing the viewing public. Zaller (1992) and Gerbner et al. (1984) 
argue that the self-selection of media messages is inconsequential when it comes to television’s 
impact on the views and attitudes of the viewing public. Zaller (1992) and Gerbner et al. (1984) 
argue that the relatively similar messages being disseminated from all television channels cause 
watching television to have a homogenizing influence on viewers. “Mainstreaming theory” holds 
that those who watch the most television, even from varied socio-demographic and geographic 
backgrounds, will have more similar views and outlooks than infrequent viewers from differing 
socio-demographic and geographic backgrounds (Gerbner et al. 1984).  Similarly, Zaller (1992) 
argues that while people inform themselves by exposure to a wide variety of outlets, most of 
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these outlets carry similar messages and form a national mainstream opinion on a variety of 
issues. These two findings are similar to those of Mutz (1992) who argues that political coverage 
can serve to homogenize opinions in the United States. By constantly reporting the “horse race” 
and pegging certain candidates or issues as “winners” or “losers,” television coverage influences 
how Americans perceive those candidates or issues (Mutz 1992). This, too, may be seen as a 
form of “mainstreaming” opinion. However, even proponents of mainstreaming theory 
acknowledge that there may, in fact, be two distinct “mainstreams” being created by television 
viewership: a “general” mainstream and a “religious” mainstream (Gerbner et al. 1984). Litman 
and Bain (1989), sounding prescient in light of the present niche-oriented media environment, 
went a step further and suggested that religious television is a form of “narrowcasting,” or 
targeting a very specific message to a very specific audience. The question of who watches 
religious television will be discussed in more depth later in this dissertation. 
Television presents a far more diverse array of programming options now than it did 
twenty or thirty years ago. Today, channels that did not exist when Gerbner et al. completed their 
work in 1984, (or Zaller his in 1992), compete for distinct blocks of the television viewing 
public, a phenomenon that did not occur in the era of three national television networks. With the 
concurrent rise of the internet during the growth of cable and satellite television, the nature of the 
mass media has changed greatly since 1992 (DiMaggio et al. 2001; Xenos and Moy 2007). 
Information Processing and Media Effects 
The analysis of media effects in Entman (1989) warrants consideration. Entman discusses 
the information processing approach and the "interdependence model.”  Rather than assessing 
whether new information presented to individuals is congruent with their previously held beliefs, 
the information processing approach argues that salience is the key factor in determining whether 
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the individuals then processes that information in their pre-established schema systems. 
"Processing may lead the person to either store the information or discard; if stored, the 
information may stimulate new beliefs or change old beliefs" (Entman 1989; 350). This is not 
wholly dissimilar from Zaller’s R-A-S model of information reception (1992). Entman and 
Zaller’s findings help highlight the relevance of non-news to the field of political science. 
Viewers of non-news broadcasting receive and process the political messages concealed within 
satirical or religious programming as it is being presented to them in an attractive, or salient, 
package. A viewer who distrusts politicians or who is disinterested in politics may disregard a 
political advertisement or a speech by a politician. The same viewer could have his or her beliefs 
and opinions molded by non-news precisely because the political manipulation is subtle and the 
political information is presented as comedic or spiritual discourse. 
The on line model of information processing offers another reason for political scientists 
to take interest in the potential power of non-news sources of information. The on line model 
finds that people do not necessarily store exact facts and figures relating to every person, place or 
thing about which they have an opinion.  Rather, people retain a kind of internal “running tally” 
of positive and negative emotions, even while they may quickly discard the information that 
caused them to develop a positive or negative impression of the concept in question (Lodge, 
McGraw and Stroh 1989; Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau 1995; Lodge, Stroh and Wahlke 1990). 
For example, viewers may not necessarily remember that their impression of a given politician 
came from a comedian mocking them for their hypocrisy or a preacher chastising their 
immorality, but they will retain a negative impression of that particular politician. This is in 
keeping with literature that has discussed the importance of affect in the formulation of 
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preferences and in the decision-making processes (Damasio 2003; Gunnell 2007; Marcus, 
Newman and Mackuen 2000; Mutz 2007; Zajonc 1980: 1984).  
The ability to make viewers feel, rather than think, may be the more powerful skill in 
influencing an audience. In particular, clinical and theoretical work alike has stressed the 
importance that negative emotional reactions have in influencing how people determine the 
importance of particular issues (Carter, Stamm and Heintz-Knowles 1992; McCombs 1999; 
Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Martin 2008; Miller 2007; Zajonc 1980).  The findings 
from clinical research align with the present work’s central theory: the attitudes and views of 
those who consume non-news are influenced by the negative depiction of out-groups within non- 
news.  
Religious Media and Satirical Media 
The two forms of broadcasts to be explored in depth in this work are religious and 
satirical television. Both satirical and religious broadcasts have long been staples of television, 
and both satirical and religious broadcasts are very popular.2  Satirical and religious broadcasts 
each have each been given a measure of academic analysis in political science, and both satirical 
and religious television may present political messages to viewers, albeit in the guise of 
humorous or spiritually uplifting television. Both religious and satirical media target out-groups 
for scorn or condemnation within their broadcasts (Baumgartner and Morris 2006; Bruce 1990; 
Hughey 1990; Jamieson and Waldman 2003; Straub 1988). In light of these facts, both religious 
and satirical television programming deserve further empirical scrutiny: just what effect does 
                                                 
2
 Conservative estimates of viewership of religious television place the number around 15-20 
million viewers per week (Bruce 1990; Green 1992; Hoover 1987). Between two to four million 
Americans in a given night watch The Tonight Show with Jay Leno or Late Night with David 
Letterman, and about 1.5 million viewers watch The Daily Show at 11 PM. Given that Stewart is 
re-broadcast several times throughout the day, the total number of viewers is likely higher 
(Konodolojy 2013).   
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viewing either religious or satirical television have upon the viewing audience?  The unique 
history and role of both religious and satirical television will be discussed distinctly, as shall the 
unique features of their consumers.  While satirical and religious media will each have a different 
impact on the viewing audience, the reasons for the effect of each overlap. As such, the theory 
and hypothesis sections of this chapter shall discuss both forms of media. Before addressing the 
research questions of this dissertation questions directly, the reader will be provided with a brief 
history of religious television in the United States, followed by an overview of how satirical 
media has been studied by the academy. This will allow for the research questions offered by this 
dissertation to be placed in proper context 
It is understood that there are other sources of religious media than simply television. 
Religious radio broadcasts were the basis of the electronic church, and remain highly popular to 
this day. Similarly, comedic online podcasts draw numerous fans, and online forms of social 
media such as Twitter have given birth to entirely new forms of comedy, such as the creation of 
satirical fake Twitter accounts. These include both parody accounts purportedly held by public 
figures (Edwin Edwards, Bill Clinton, Rahm Emmanuel) or entirely fake personages holding 
accounts that satirize modern life (Karl Welzein). However, the present work will focus strictly 
on television, rather than radio or broadcasts available on the internet. There are qualities unique 
to television that would lead to media effects distinct from those of the internet, radio or print 
media (Forgette and Morris 2006; McLuhan 1964; Mutz 2007; Robinson 1975; Robinson 1976.) 
Additionally, there is admittedly scant data currently available concerning, for example religious 
radio or satirical internet broadcasts. Data on these forms of media would have proven especially 
useful when attempting to demonstrate the singular nature of television media effects 
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Religious Television: Background and Context 
 One of the most distinct features of American culture is the value placed upon two 
seemingly incongruous social phenomena: religion, particularly Christianity (Wilcox 2000)3, and 
electronic media, particularly television. Living in the birthplace of television, Americans 
continue to watch more television than any other nation in the world (Gilson 2009). Among 
Western nations, America is unique in that prosperity and modernity has not led to an increase in 
postmaterial thought and a subsequent abandoning of formal religion  (Andersen and Fetner 
2008; Clark 2010; Eckstein 1988; Inglehart 1997). In light of America’s continued love of the 
electronic media and of religion, it seems fitting that the first merger of religion and the 
electronic media occurred in the United States.  
The first regular religious broadcasting in the world began on January 2nd, 1921 when the 
Cavalry Episcopal Church in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania began transmitting services on the AM 
station KDKA (Stacey and Shupe 1982). This is the “mustard seed” which grew into the multi-
million dollar4 multimedia phenomenon of religious broadcasting, dubbed by critics and 
                                                 
3
 While Americans remain predominantly Christian, they still tend to hold those who hold some 
kind of religious beliefs in higher regard than those who are atheists. See Robinson 2011where a 
Gallup poll from 2007 shows only 45% of Americans would vote for an “otherwise qualified” 
member of their political party who was an atheist for President of the United States. By way of 
comparison, 55% would vote for an “otherwise qualified” homosexual who was a member of 
their political party, and 72% would vote for an “otherwise qualified” Mormon member of their 
political party. Findings such as these make it appear safe to say that, while it is debatable 
whether or not America is a “Christian Nation,” it is certainly a “Religious Nation”. See Also 
Wilcox 2000 
4
 During the hey-day of televangelism in the early to mid 1980s, media expenditures for the top 
televangelists included $106,000,000 by Jimmy Swaggart, $100,000,000 by Jerry Falwell, 
$66,000,000 for Jim Bakker and $60,000,000 for Oral Roberts. Crushing the competition with 
his media empire was Pat Robertson, who spent $233,000,000 in 1985.  It should be noted that, 
these being among the more successful of the television preachers, their intake likely greatly 
exceeded their expenditures. The fact that Pat Robertson was spending nearly a quarter of a 
billion dollars in 1985 on his media empire must be stressed. In 2012 dollars, that means Pat 
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followers alike as, “The Electronic Church.” Academic works on the nature of religious media in 
the United States have been published, such as histories of religious media (Goff 1999; Lazerson 
1985), biographies of televangelists such as Oral Roberts (Harrell 1985) or case studies regarding 
the 1988 Presidential run by Pat Robertson (Green and Guth 1988; Harrell 1987; Hertzke 1993). 
However, there are few empirical academic explorations into the nature of the effects of 
consuming religious media. This work hopes to address that gap in the literature by addressing 
the media effects associated with the consumption of religious television and satirical television, 
respectively. 
History of The Electronic Church 
 After the Civil War, America experienced a great period of growth and migration. 
Immigrants from Europe came to America in unprecedented numbers. Populations boomed, not 
only in established urban centers, but also along the Western frontier. The religious revival of the 
late 1800s and early 1900s, including the Second Great Awakening in the West, was a response 
to this sudden change in American society. During this time period, non-Protestants arrived from 
overseas, and immigrants and native-born Americans alike were moving to unchurched, untamed 
lands in America’s West (Hadden 1987). Hadden (1987) proffers the theory that this upswing in 
religiosity was not just the case of requiring more preachers and churches to tend to the needs of 
a mobile and rapidly growing population; the revival was a reaction to the new “uncivilized” 
character of America, including the relatively new phenomenon of urban poverty in the United 
States. These charismatic5 preachers, and the adherents to their messages, believed that their new 
                                                                                                                                                             
Robertson was spending about $525,000,000 in a single year on his television ministry, an 
extraordinary amount of money! (Elvy 1987; Mickelthwait and Wooldridge 2009) 
5
 When the word “charismatic” is used in this work, it is not being used in the secular sense, as in 
“possessing an extraordinary ability to attract,” but in the religious sense, meaning, “a form of 
Christianity that emphasizes the Holy Spirit.” 
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strain of Christianity offered both personal salvation to those who accepted the message of Jesus, 
and cures for the societal ills that were ailing the nation (Hadden 1987).  
The revivalist preachers differed from the denominational structure of American 
Protestantism that had heretofore dominated the American religious landscape. These preachers, 
and those who assisted them in staging revivals and evangelistic crusades, were independent and 
autonomous from the denominational churches that already existed in the United States, but 
“crossed sectarian boundaries and drew their support from Christians who belonged to a wide 
variety of churches” (Hadden and Shupe 1988). Hadden and Shupe (1988) describe these 
organizational structures as parachurches. The independent, autonomous, yet cross-sectional 
nature of these parachurches is of particular importance as it “provide(s), in both form and 
content, the organizational model of the contemporary electronic church” (Hadden 1987; 9). Like 
the revivalist of the late 19th and early 20th century, the modern day televangelist is free from any 
denominational constraints, and draws audiences that reach across ecumenical boundaries 
(Harrell 1985). This freedom also means that the modern day televangelist is responsible for 
staging the entire “production” on his own.  Paying for space, a choir, and the preacher’s own 
salary and lifestyle, are the duties of the preacher; there is no governing body to make sure bills 
are paid. This means direct solicitations from the preacher’s audience are required for the 
continued operations of the preacher’s ministry (Abelman 1987a, Hughey 1990).6 It is perhaps 
not surprising, then, that the greatest pioneer in the use of the relatively new medium of 
television to grow his ministry was also one of the last great “old time” tent revivalists in the 
United States, Oral Roberts (Harrell 1985). 
                                                 
6
 For an example of a transitional figure in the rise of the electronic church, juggling missionary 
duties as well as maintaining ratings See Goff (1999) 
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The similarities between the revivalist preacher of the Second Great Awakening and the 
modern televangelist do not stop at how their ministries were organized. In terms of both 
structure and theology, there are strong links between the revivalist movement of the early 20th 
century and the electronic church of today. Like the modern televangelist, the revivalist of the 
late 19th century and early 20th century was preaching a conservative brand of Christianity, 
sometimes charismatic or Pentecostal, sometimes fundamentalist.7 The next key link between the 
revivalists and the televangelists is the fact that evangelicals and fundamentalists, theological 
descendants of those who traveled the countryside and built massive audiences during the 
revivalist period via parachurches rather than through the existing denominational structures in 
place in the United States, eventually took over the religious airwaves.  
The Communications Act of 1934 allowed for the FCC to grant licenses to stations. 
While never specifying the details of the arrangement, it was understood that stations were 
required to offer some of their airtime to “public interest” programming, which included 
religious programming. Both national and local networks gave this airtime, free of charge, to 
                                                 
7
 It is not possible to do justice to the theological distinctions between charismatics and 
Pentecostals, fundamentalists and evangelicals in the confines of this work without embarking 
upon a lengthy digression. While not essential for the understanding of the remainder of the 
work, the reader may want some insight as to what these words mean, as the terms will be used 
repeatedly. Pentecostals and charismatics believe in the importance of “spiritual gifts” being 
bestowed upon believers by the Holy Spirit, such as “glossolalia, prophecy, miracles and faith 
healing”. Fundamentalists take a more conservative approach, generally, and believe in the 
inerrancy of the Bible. Evangelicals stress the necessity for being “born again” into Jesus Christ, 
and like fundamentalists, see the Bible as the “the only trustworthy guide in moral and spiritual 
matters” and tend to see themselves at odds with the rest of society. Generally speaking, 
however, evangelicals tend to be more tolerant of those from different Christian backgrounds, 
such as Pentecostals, than do fundamentalists. Each of these groups has played a distinct role in 
the rise of the electronic church, and for reference the reader may want to think of men like Oral 
Roberts as examples of a Pentecostal figure, whereas Jerry Falwell would be representative of 
the fundamentalist movement.  For a more detailed overview of these groups and their impact in 
American Politics, See Wilcox 2000; 25-30, Hertzke (1993), Campbell (2006), Green and Guth 
(1988), Harrell (1987), Smidt, (1988)  
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mainline religious groups (Hadden and Shupe 1988). In 1960, however, the FCC issued a 
directive stating that there was no requirement that “public interest” airtime be given away for 
free by the stations; networks could sell the airtime to, for example, religious groups, and still be 
serving the “public interest” as far as the FCC was concerned. The stations made the logical 
decision to stop giving away for free that which could be sold; after the FCC decree, ninety-two 
percent of all religious broadcasting in the United States became paid-time broadcasting (Hadden 
1987). This shift caused the mainline churches, unwilling or unable to compete commercially, to 
lose their airtime to the evangelical and fundamental preachers for whom “the confluence of 
evangelical proselytizing zeal and the commercial fee-enterprise system go together well” 
(Hadden 1987; 16).8 The formation of the National Religious Broadcasters (NRB) in 1944 also 
played a large role in allowing evangelicals to dominate the religious airwaves. 
 Founded by 150 evangelical broadcasters in Columbus, Ohio, the NRB quickly 
established powerful connections in Washington, DC, that have worked to represent the interests 
of non-denominational, evangelical broadcasters (Hadden and Shupe 1988). One of the major 
accomplishments of the NRB was ensuring that “public interest” air time could be purchased on 
the open market, rather than simply being set aside for mainline Protestant groups. Coming from 
a tradition where each preacher is individually responsible for their own ministry, the 
televangelist is thus able to continue in the revivalist model with minimum modifications. 
Who Uses The Electronic Church? 
There are demographic characteristics of the users of religious broadcasting that do set 
them apart from Americans as a whole. They tend to be older, lower income, less educated, more 
likely to be “blue collar” and more likely to be female. Additionally, and unsurprisingly, people 
                                                 
8
 See Also Hughey (1990) and his discussion of the relationship between Protestantism and the 
free market capitalist system dating back to Weber. 
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who watch religious broadcasting tend to be more religious than the average American. 
Specifically, they are more likely to be church members, to participate in other religious 
activities, to be Protestant and evangelical and conservative in religious and social outlooks 
(Abelman 1987a; 199-200; Litman and Bain 1989). Additional studies have also shown that: 
• Women are more likely to watch or listen to religious broadcasts than men; 
• Non-whites moderately more likely to listen or view than whites; 
• Viewers are more likely to live in rural areas than cities; 
• And viewers are more likely to live in the South than the Northeast (Gerbner et 
al. 1984; Hoover 1987; Pettersson 1986)9.  
Complimenting these studies are more recent works demonstrating that, among African-
Americans, rural African-Americans in the South are more likely to watch religious 
programming than other African-Americans (Park and Baker 2007; Sherkat and Cunningham 
1998). 
Satirical Media: Context and Background 
In addition to exploring the impact that religious television has upon its audience’s views 
and outlooks, this work also looks to explore the impact that satirical television programs can 
have upon the audience’s views and outlooks. Specifically, this dissertation empirically tests the 
concept that satirical media, by holding up certain targets for ridicule or scorn, does more than 
provide laughs for its audience. It is hypothesized that satirical media can and does influence the 
views of the audience as to those groups or persons made into the butts of the comedy. The 
divisive nature of television does little to bring groups together, but serves to cause greater 
                                                 
9
 Pettersson’s study examined Swedish consumers of religious media and found that, again, 
“…frequent TV service viewers are predominantly older, less educated, female, and “rural”. 
They also score higher on such measures of religiosity as private prayer, Bible reading and 
identifying oneself as a “confessing Christian” or “religious person”.” Pettersson, pg. 395 
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feelings of antipathy towards the “out-groups” targeted to be the objects of ridicule in televised 
satires (Forgette and Morris 2006; Martin 2008; Mutz 2007; Mutz and Reeves 2005 Robinson 
1975). This work does not hypothesize that satirical media makes one more likely to support 
Democratic or liberal candidates or causes, but that satirical media does cause viewers to be 
more hostile to Republican or conservative candidates or groups. To begin with first principles, 
this chapter will begin with a definition and a distinction.  Some clarification may be needed in 
explaining what is meant by the term, “satirical” television programming, as opposed to simply 
“comedic” television programming. 
The creator of the long-running animated sitcom The Simpsons, Matt Groening, described 
the theme running through the series as, “the people in power don’t always have your best 
interests in mind” (Cantor 1999; 745). Indeed, a strain of anti-establishment thought seems to be 
present in all forms of satire, be it televised late night talk shows, humor magazines such as 
“MAD” or even in satire packaged as something as innocuous as a sitcom. Thompson (2009) 
provides a strong definition of satire while expressing the idea of “sitcom satire.” Looking 
specifically at the popular animated series The King of the Hill, Thompson (2009) states: “Most 
simply, to satirize is to scrutinize, which requires an object to study and, ultimately, to 
ridicule…Satire, then, means laughing ‘at’ someone whose behavior or beliefs deserve ridicule. 
The question is, who does the audience understand that someone to be?” (Thompson 2009; 40-
41). Thompson (2009) not only provides this project with a working definition of satire, but also 
raises a question that this dissertation will explore. Who is being ridiculed in these televised 
satires, and how does this ridicule affect the audience? It is argued in this dissertation that while 
viewers may be tuning in for laughs, they are getting more than a welcome dose of humor; they 
also are having their views and attitudes shaped by the satirical programs they view.  
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Who Uses Satirical Media? 
Who is the audience for satirical media, and why do they watch? There is scant empirical 
information regarding the audience for satire, generally. However, there have been several 
studies of individual satirical programs that generally indicate the audience for this form of 
entertainment tends to be younger, better educated and more likely to live in an urban area than 
the typical television viewer. The recent spate of research into The Daily Show stresses that Jon 
Stewart’s audience is young, “hip” and college educated, thus making them the sort of 
demographic that academics, policy makers and advertisers find fascinating (Baumgartner and 
Morris 2006; Cao 2008; Fox and Sahin 2007; Hart and Hartelius 2007; Holbert et al. 2007; 
Hollander 2005; LaMarre et al. 2009; Young and Esralew 2011). However, even academic 
articles that discuss older satirical programming discuss how the target audience for the anti-
establishment form of entertainment fits this same mold. 
 Cantor (1999) discussed how The Simpsons influences the way Americans think, 
“particularly the younger generation” (Cantor 1999; 734). Carr (1992) discusses the clashes 
between CBS and the comedic duo The Smothers Brothers regarding the political content of the 
program The Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour, culminating in the network’s decision to cancel 
the program in 1969.  In doing so, Carr (1992) describes how the satirical program’s appeal with 
younger, more urban viewers “created a kind of us versus them rhetoric” (Carr 1992; 13). 
Similarly, there has been a spate of research in the field recently demonstrating that, while 
younger viewers may not necessarily watch more satirical media, they do seem to be more 
affected by it (Cao 2008; Hart and Hartelius 2007; Hollander 2005; Landreville, Holbert and 
LaMarre 2010; Parkin 2010; Young and Tisinger 2006). It has been argued that part of the 
reason for the success of programs such as The Daily Show in reaching younger audiences is the 
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fact that satire, while demanding and fostering skepticism from its audience, also holds out an 
ultimate promise that things can get better. "Though humor in art is less likely to elicit profound 
understanding of propaganda, it has an immediate appeal and more direct political consequences 
than pessimism” (Edelman 1988; 128 Young and Esralew 2011; 5).  However, recent studies 
have demonstrated that viewers of The Daily Show report not only higher levels of confidence in 
their own abilities to understand the political landscape, they also report stronger negative 
feelings towards political candidates, a wide spectrum of political institutions and the news 
media generally (Baumgartner and Morris 2006). Further investigation into whether satirical 
media fosters cynicism and negative views towards select out-groups is thus warranted.  
Baum (2005) broached the idea of viewers receiving political information from non-news 
sources including entertainment-focused talk shows, or “E-Talk shows.”  Keeping with the 
theory underpinning this work, Baum (2005) found that these ostensibly apolitical programs 
could and did still have an impact on how viewers felt about political figures. In a marked 
contrast from this work, Baum (2005) showed how E-Talk shows actually increased positive 
feelings towards political figures from viewers of the opposite party. At first blush, those 
findings may call into question “videomalaise” theory and its progeny, including the present 
work. A closer examination of Baum (2005) reveals some marked differences between that work 
and this dissertation.  Baum (2005) concludes that E-Talk shows cause low-information voters to 
become more likely to cross party lines in order to support a candidate who appeared on an E-
Talk show, as E-Talk show appearances humanize guests. This would seem to run against the 
distorting, confrontational aspect of television that is central to this analysis. However, when we 
look at how Baum (2005) analyzed respondents when looking for the effect of consuming E-Talk 
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Shows, we see that late night comedies have been excluded from consideration.10 Despite 
mentioning candidates appearing on late night talk shows such as The Tonight Show with Jay 
Leno or Late Night with David Letterman in the introduction to his work, and despite examining 
the content of these two programs (as well as four daytime talk shows, The Oprah Winfrey Show, 
The Rosie O’Donnell Show, Live! With Regis and Kathy Lee and The Queen Latifah Show) in 
order to contrast E-Talk shows with “hard news” Baum’s analysis vis a vis the impact of 
consuming “E-Talk Shows” is concerned only with candidate appearances on daytime television 
talk shows “such as Oprah Winfrey, Rosie O’Donnell or Jerry Springer” (Baum 2005; 219).   
A further contrast between this work and Baum (2005) is the fact that Baum’s work is 
focused around those instances where a political figure (such as a candidate for President of the 
United States) appears on a daytime talk show. It stands to reason that a regular viewer of 
daytime television may consider the rare occasion that a presidential candidate appears on the 
program to mark this a “very special episode,” and they will tune in and seek out political 
information. This does not exenterate the central theory of this dissertation; rather this work and 
Baum’s can co-exist quite easily. Simply because there are those “must see television events” 
where a political figure may appear on a program, and viewers specifically tune in to learn 
something about the issues or the figure, does not mean that viewers cannot also watch their 
regular nightly line-up of favorite programs, not expecting to encounter political messages, and 
nonetheless have their views altered by the programs they have watched. 
In discussing his conclusion, the reader must also consider the fact that Baum (2005), 
despite mentioning satirical programs such as David Letterman’s in the body of his work and 
                                                 
10
 In fairness to Baum, he was working with the data that available to him via the 2000 ANES. 
Questions regarding watching late night comedic talk shows were not asked in this particular 
panel. 
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despite analyzing the content of The Tonight Show with Jay Leno and Late Night with David 
Letterman, does not consider in his model how often viewers watched these (or any other) late 
night talk shows. In short, Baum (2005) proffers his theory that low-information voters will gain 
a more favorable view of candidates due to their appearances on E-Talk shows without including 
satirical or comedic programs in his definition of “E-Talk Show”11; Baum only includes non-
satirical and non-comedic daytime television talk shows in his model. The failure to include 
satirical late night talks shows distinguishes Baum’s article from this dissertation. Just as talk 
shows do not have to be satirical, though, satirical programs are not limited to the talk show 
format. 
Thompson (2009) also makes an intriguing case that satire can come in unconventional 
forms.  Critical theorists both within and outside the field of political science have argued that 
television sitcoms--long thought banal escapism and cavalcade of mediocrity--have a substantive 
impact on the audience’s political views and attitudes (Goldman 1982; Rabinovitz 1989). While 
this concept is somewhat outside the scope of this project, continued explorations in the vein of 
the present work would seek to empirically test the idea that television sitcoms indeed have 
“fairly elaborate, though often unarticulated, political-ideological foundations” (Feldman and 
Sigelman 1985) that influence the opinions and behavior of the prime-time audience. This is 
again, not a new phenomenon, as Carr (1992; 3) notes that programs such as All in the Family in 
the early 1970s “pushed the boundaries of controversy and relevance…” A handful of scholars 
outside the discipline of political science have empirically tested the impact that sitcoms can 
have on their audience.  
                                                 
11
 Though it is debatable as to whether The Jerry Springer Show was actually intended as a 
highly crude satire of the popular daytime television talk show format. 
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The sitcom Will and Grace, notable for prominently featuring homosexual characters, 
was the subject of studies into how audiences responded to its characterizations of the more 
subdued gay character Will, as well as the more flamboyant character Jack (Cooper 2003). 
However, Cooper (2003) only intimated at the broader implications of his study. Work could be 
done to explore how the audiences’ fondness for both Jack and Will could impact their views on 
gay rights.  
What Does It All Mean? 
The central argument of this dissertation is that non-news broadcasts influence the 
attitudes and opinions of those viewers. In light of television’s propensity to highlight conflict 
and present a hostile view of the world to its viewers (Forgette and Morris 2006; Mutz and 
Reeves 2005; Robinson 1976), it is expected that non-news has its greatest impact influencing 
the negative views and outlooks of the audience. Rather than causing audience members to feel 
more warmly towards certain groups, persons or ideas, non-news fosters negative feelings 
towards certain out-groups targeted for ridicule or condemnation. Contrarily, some argue that 
consumers of non-news may be intentionally seek out such programs precisely for the political 
messages. In other words, low-information viewers may dislike “hard” news, but seek out “soft” 
news formats in order to receive information about the wider world around them (Baum 2005). 
In the light of their ubiquity, popularity and relevance to social scientists, this work focuses upon 
religious television and satirical late night talk shows. 
  How should those who are exposed to religious broadcasting differ from not only the 
general population, but from other religious Americans? In what way should consumers of 
religious television be expected to differ from those who do not consume religious television? 
How should consumers of satirical television differ from the general public, both in outlook and 
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in their socio-demographic characteristics? One notable feature of religious broadcasting is that 
there is an overt “us vs. them” component to the theology of many religious broadcasters. Those 
who tune in to the program are “saved,” but the rest of society is not. Specific “out-groups” in 
society are often targeted for ridicule and scorn, such as homosexuals and atheists (Bruce 1990; 
Hughey 1990; Straub 1988). Hughey (1990) calls this the distinction between the “righteous we” 
and “sinful others”: 
“…in apparent reluctance to offend the very people on whose financial generosity they 
depend, modern televangelists generally imply that Hell is reserved for others. The viewing 
audience is usually assumed to be among the ranks of the ‘Righteous We’…while responsibility 
for any moral or other deficiencies in the larger society are pointedly attributed to ‘Sinful Others’ 
who are enemies of the godly-i.e, to abortionists, pornographers, homosexuals, rock stars, secular 
humanists, and liberals in general”(Hughey 1990; 42). 
 
Considering this dichotomous view of society being presented in religious television, one 
composed of saved people of virtue and of damned sinners, it is expected that exposure to these 
messages will lead to antipathy--if not outright hostility--towards the societal out-groups being 
presented as sinful and Godless. 
One of the key features of the audience for satirical media that has caused The Daily 
Show to be of such interest among academics-as well as journalists and advertisers-is that its 
audience skews young, college-educated and relatively affluent (Baumgartner and Morris 2006; 
Cao 2008; Fox and Sahin 2007; Hart and Hartelius 2007; Holbert et al. 2007; Hollander 2005; 
LaMarre et al. 2009; Young and Esralew 2011). If satire is particularly the purview of young 
educated urbanites, it stands to reason that the audience for such programs would skew liberal in 
their tastes and outlooks. Where this dissertation is staking new ground is in stating that the type 
of liberal outlooks and attitudes the viewers hold will be distinct from that of other well-educated 
urban liberals. It is in the hostility towards selected out-groups, such as conservative political 
figures and groups, where consumers of satirical media will be differentiated from their 
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ideological and socio-demographic peers. It is also anticipated that increased consumption of 
satirical late-night talk shows will not correlate significantly with increased positive feelings 
towards liberal political figures or groups. 
 
Conclusion 
 Media effects remains a thriving area of study in the social sciences. With the minimal 
effects school having been largely discarded, social scientists have moved on to exploring the 
specificities of media effects. This includes studying the distinct effects that different forms of 
media have upon their audience. Works have demonstrated that television has a unique impact 
upon the viewing audience, and have analyzed how different forms of television broadcasts can 
have varying effects on viewers. While numerous works have examined the ways in which 
overtly political television broadcasts-such as political advertisements, presidential debates and 
cable news-can influence viewers’ opinions, few works in political science have looked to 
explore the impact that the political messages contained in non-news broadcasts. This 
dissertation fills that gap. Examining the case studies of satirical late night talk shows and 
religious programming, this dissertation analyzes the impact these forms of television can have 
on viewers’ opinions towards targeted out-groups. The next chapter will discuss the experiment 
that utilized in measuring the effect that exposure to satirical or religious media can have upon a 
viewers’ opinions towards specific out-groups. 
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CHAPTER III: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN: NON-NEWS SOURCES AND PROPOSITION 8 
 
A major problem facing the researcher who wishes to measure media effects solely using 
survey data is the potential of self-selection occurring in the audience. It is possible that there is 
simply a unique subset of religious Americans, for example, who otherwise resemble other 
religious Americans, but who hold particularly hostile opinions towards certain societal out-
groups. These religious Americans would gravitate towards religious programming that reflects 
their worldview. Thus, it could be possible that religious Americans who particularly dislike 
homosexuals or atheists are also the religious Americans who tune in to watch religious 
television due to the “righteous we vs. sinful others” messaging discussed in Chapter Two 
(Bruce 1990; Hughey 1990; Straub 1988). Any analysis on data sets pertaining to television 
viewing habits would run the risk of simply stating the obvious: people with certain views or 
opinions watch television programs that reflect their views and opinions. This leads into an 
additional potential hurdle, the idea that it may not be television influencing the viewer, but 
viewers influencing the content of television programs. 
The potential for self-selection biasing the results of any analysis would simultaneously 
call into question the direction of the causal arrow of this study. One could argue that it is not the 
case that religious media effects its audience, but that there is a core constituency that is 
religiously and socially conservative. These religiously and socially conservative television 
viewers could want to hear messages that reflect their hostility towards homosexuals or atheists, 
and they would then tune in to programming that they feel accurately reflects their values. 
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Producers of religious television programs would then change the content of their broadcasts to 
make sure that it is particularly anti-homosexual or particularly anti-atheist. Similarly, it is 
possible that those drawn to late-night comedy programs such as The Daily Show already have 
little respect for conservative public figures. Other late night comedy producers and writers 
would then scramble to make sure their programs are filled with as many jokes about 
conservatives or Republicans as possible in order to attract these viewers.  Simply put, there is a 
possibility that the audience is influencing the television program content (Chozick 2011). 
Network executives and the creative forces that are responsible for the content of television 
programs may modify their product based on what it is that they feel the audience wants to hear 
(Behr and Iyengar 1985). Fortunately, this argument has not proven insurmountable for media 
effects scholars. 
It is uncontroversial that networks air programs that they feel will attract viewers. In fact, 
one of this study’s central arguments is that one reason for the hostility towards out-groups 
present in these non-news sources of information is precisely in order to attract viewers; scholars 
in the field have demonstrated that television viewers are attracted to conflict (Mutz 2007; Mutz 
and Reeves 2005; Postman 1986). This fact does not mean that the programs do not still have an 
impact in shaping the views and attitudes of its audience.12 Behr and Iyengar (1985) 
demonstrated that news coverage is mostly unaffected by public opinion. To the contrary, what 
Behr and Iyengar (1985) found was not that the public influenced media messages, but that 
media messages were influencing the public. More recent studies confirmed the findings of Behr 
and Iyengar (1985), and demonstrated that television news broadcasts did not just focus upon 
those issues or topics that viewers wanted to hear. Additionally, it has been demonstrated that the 
                                                 
12
 Nor does it change the fact that that television qua television is a hostile, confrontational form 
of media (Forgette and Morris 2006; Mutz and Reeves 2005; Postman 1986; Robinson 1976). 
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issues the media chooses to cover, and how the media chooses to cover those issues, influences 
how viewers prioritized issues (Goidel and Langley 1995; Iyengar and Simon 1993; Miller 2007; 
Mutz 1992). Coupled with the statistically significant findings from numerous scholars in the 
field of media effects (Bartels 1993; Forgette and Morris 2006; Groseclose 2011; Martin 2008; 
Mutz 1998; Zaller 1992; 1996), it can be stated with confidence that the influence that television 
media has over the American public is not a mirage, and that television content is not just a 
reflection of the values and norms of the home viewing audience. We know this in no small part 
because of experiments that have been conducted by scholars demonstrating the impact of media 
effects. 
Experiments allow the researcher to probe, if not prove, causal hypotheses (Campbell and 
Stanley 1966; Cook and Campbell 1979; Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982). Additionally, 
experimental research has gained increasing prominence among researchers looking to 
demonstrate that media has more than just a minimal effect on its audience. Experimental 
designs in both laboratory and field settings have repeatedly demonstrated that media messages 
can cause change in political attitudes and behaviors (Forgette and Morris 2006; Gerber and 
Green 2000; Gerber et al. 2007; Hayes 2008; Iyengar 1987; Iyengar 1991; Iyengar and Kinder 
1987; Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982; Ladd 2009; Miller 2007; Mutz and Reeves 2005; 
Neuman, Just and Crigler 1992). This dissertation is therefore following accepted protocol in 
utilizing an experimental design to measure media effects, but will be utilizing state of the art 
resources such as Mechanical Turk and Qualtrics in doing so. There are some concerns in using 
experimental designs in the social sciences, however, and those shall be addressed in the next 
section. 
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Experimental Methodology in Political Science 
Cook and Campbell (1979) highlight one of the concerns in using an experimental setting 
in the social sciences, the dilemma of making generalizable to the broader outside world the 
results divined in the controlled laboratory environment: 
  
“The advantages of experimental control for inferring causation have to be weighed 
against the disadvantages that arise because we do not always want to learn about causation in 
controlled settings. Instead, for many purposes, we would like to be able to generalize to causal 
relationships in complex field settings, and we cannot easily assume that findings from the 
laboratory will hold in the field…most of the social phenomena of theoretical and practical social 
interest from which we want to generalize occur in markedly less controlled settings than either 
the laboratory or the staged short-term experiment…” (Cook and Campbell 1979; 7).  
  
An experimental design intended to capture media effects may lead to such a dilemma. 
Consumers of religious or satirical media do not consume the media messages in “single-shot” 
doses. Viewers of The Daily Show or The 700 Club may be frequent viewers, watching the 
programs on a regular basis over a period of weeks, months or even years. Additionally, even 
those who only sporadically view satirical or religious media do not do so in a controlled 
laboratory environment. They may flip from channel-to-channel. They may have the television 
on as white noise as they complete other tasks or eat meals. The broadcasts themselves may be 
seen in the context of a larger television watching experience. Rather than viewing a 
concentrated dose of satirical or religious television, a viewer may watch a hockey game, then 
The Daily Show, then flip the channel to watch an action movie.  In order to alleviate some of the 
concerns addressed above, the present study will have the subjects view the required visual 
materials in a time and place of their own choosing, rather than a laboratory or other unfamiliar 
environment. It is also expected that the fact that the visual materials are to be consumed on-line, 
at the leisure of the subject, may offer more of an ersatz approximation of the television viewing 
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experience than requiring the subjects to watch the visual materials in a classroom or other 
controlled environment. 
There are also concerns that subjects in a social science experiment may attempt to adjust 
their behavior "given the artificiality of the research setting and their perceptions of the aims of 
the study" (Norris and Sanders 1998; 7). However, previous experimental works on media 
effects have instituted mechanisms that attempt to control for these factors. In order to try to 
control for subjects altering their behavior in order to conform to what they think is "correct" 
deception has been employed in order to keep subjects unsure as to the researcher's true aims 
(Norris and Sanders 1998).  In the present case, respondents were told that they were being asked 
as to their television viewing habits, rather than being told that the experiment was seeking to 
study media effects.  Answering critics (Livingston 1996) who say that experiments such as the 
one utilized in this dissertation are too far removed from realistic television viewing habits as it 
provides only a single “dose” of video treatment, as opposed to measuring long-term effects of 
consuming media messages, it has even been argued that the use of a single-shot experiment 
ensures that respondents do not become conditioned to the experimental setting itself (Norris and 
Sanders 1998; Norris and Sanders 2002). Experiments have also shown that such single-shot 
exposures to stimuli can produce the anticipated responses, but that the effects dissipate quickly, 
"so organizations using this kind of mobilization tool should either rely on repeated exposure or 
on an immediate capitalization of the mobilization effort" (Hooghe et al. 2010; 422). The 
dissipation of the effect is why the respondents in my experimental design are instructed to 
complete the post-screening questionnaire promptly upon viewing of the visual materials. 
Experimental Design  
 This dissertation uses respondents recruited via the Amazon service Mechanical Turk 
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(MTurk)13, as that the use of undergraduate college students could lead to problems in terms of 
the generalizability of the findings. While scholars in other disciplines were the vanguard in 
using MTurk to recruit subjects, political scientists have begun to take advantage of the pool of 
respondents offered by MTurk (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang and 
Gosling 2011; Chandler and Kapelner 2010; Chen and Horton 2010; Schaffner 2011; Sorokin 
and Forsyth 2008). The use of MTurk allows the analysis to feature respondents who are more 
representative of the population of the United States than those used in published political 
science articles which utilize samples of undergraduates alone to be analyzed in this dissertation 
(Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012).  Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012) detail the operations of 
MTurk in their article: 
“To initiate a survey using MTurk, a researcher (a “Requester” in Amazon’s lingo) establishes an 
account (www.mturk.com), places funds into her account, and then posts a “job listing” using the 
MTurk web interface that describes the Human Intelligence Task (HIT) to be completed and the 
compensation to be paid…Each HIT has a designated number of tasks and the requester can 
specify how many times an individual MTurk “Worker” can undertake the task. Researchers can 
also set requirements for subjects, including country of residence and prior “approval rate”…The 
MTurk interface gives the researcher a great deal of flexibility to conduct a study. In addition to 
using MTurk’s embedded workspace to set up simple tasks, the researcher can also refer subjects 
to an external website. For instance, subjects might be redirected to a webpage to take a survey 
with an embedded experimental manipulation…Additionally, outside websites make it easy to 
obtain informed consent, implement additional screening procedures, debrief after an 
experiment, and collect detailed information about the survey process (including response times 
for items…The final stage for the researcher is compensating subjects. The researcher can easily 
authorize payment for the task through the MTurk web interface” (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 
2012; 352-353). 
 
While respondents were recruited using MTurk, the experimental design in this 
dissertation is hosted online by the Qualtrics.com service. While thus far there are few published 
works in the social sciences that have taken advantage of the services provided by Qualtrics 
                                                 
13
 The experimental design was initially piloted at The University of Mississippi during the 
summer of 2012 in order to test face validity and technical issues. 
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(Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012; Lede Zuniga, Jung and Valenzuela 2012), academics in a wide 
variety of other fields have published research that has utilized Qualtrics to host surveys and also 
to recruit panels (Manuj et al. 2011; Patrick and Hagtvedt 2012; Rebman et al. 2012). 
Structure of The Experimental Design 
 Subjects were randomly divided into three groups. The first group received a three-
minute clip of religious media, specifically, a clip from The 700 Club featuring Pat Robertson 
discussing California’s Proposition 8.14 The second group received a three-minute clip of 
satirical media, specifically, a clip from Comedy Central’s The Daily Show featuring Jon Stewart 
discussing California’s Proposition 815. The third group is the control group, and received a 
three-minute clip of network news16 reporting on the same issue being discussed in the visual 
materials presented to the two test groups. There are several reasons why Proposition 8 was 
selected to be the issue discussed in each clip.  The debate over Proposition 8--and the coverage 
of that debate--featured each of the out-groups targeted by the respective forms of non-news 
television analyzed in this dissertation. Homosexuals and gay rights supporters were visible in 
their opposition to Proposition 8, just as conservative Christian groups, particularly the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, were visible in their support for the measure. This means 
that both religious television programs and satirical television programs were able to take stark 
                                                 
14
 Proposition 8 was a California ballot measure/state constitutional amendment voted on in 
November of 2008. The measure stated, in the part relevant to this dissertation, “only marriage 
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California”. The clip from The 700 Club is 
a newscaster’s commentary on Proposition 8 from the June 16th, 2008, episode of The 700 Club 
and Pat Robertson’s commentary on gay marriage in California from the December 12th, 2007, 
episode of The 700 Club. Robertson’s commentary in the June 16th episode, complete with 
references to “fire and brimstone” and a graphic retelling of the legend of Sodom and Gomorrah, 
was thought too incendiary for the purposes of this experiment. 
15
 The segment, entitled “I Now Denounce You Chuck and Larry” is from episode #13142 of 
The Daily Show, originally aired November 3rd, 2008. 
16
 KCRA 3, NBC’s local affiliate in Sacramento, California. The video was uploaded to 
YouTube by KCRA’s official YouTube account on October 20, 2008. 
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positions on the issue-and make clear just who the opposition is. Additionally, the fact that both 
The 700 Club and The Daily Show discussed the issue several times allowed for the researcher to 
have a selection of from which they could choose the appropriate treatments for this study.  
As MTurk users could access the survey at the time and place of their choosing the 
experimental occasions, as well as the answering of the pre-screening questionnaires, has been 
randomized. This was done in order to achieve “balanced representation” of potential sources of 
bias such as “…time of day, day of week, portion of semester, nearness to examinations, etc.” 
(Campbell and Stanley 1966; 184). Each respondent in the same session will thus have more 
similar intrasession histories, and thus have sources of similarity other than the exposure to the 
visual materials (Campbell and Stanley 1966). Each test subject was given a prescreening 
questionnaire in order to obtain socio-demographic information, as well as determine their 
partisanship and ideology, their religiosity, and how often they consume religious, satirical and 
news media.  After then being exposed to one of the three video clips, test subjects were then 
each given a brief post-screening questionnaire to gauge their opinions as to both the issue of gay 
marriage as well as the selected out-groups that were featured within the visual materials.  
Hypotheses 
 Robinson’s (1976) videomalaise theory and its progeny propose that television presents a 
distorted vision of reality that is more negative and conflict-laden than the world outside the 
television screen (Dahl 1967; Forgette and Morris 2006; Martin 2008; Mutz 2007; Mutz and 
Reeves 2005). It is thus anticipated that exposure to non-news programs that contain political 
messages will lead to increased antipathy towards the out-groups targeted for derision in those 
programs. It is also anticipated that exposure to the treatments will not lead to a corresponding 
increase in warm feelings towards the implied in-groups for each form of media. While 
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television can present external targets for hostility or contempt, videomalaise theory taken to its 
next logical step would hold that television does not also foster positive, inclusive sentiments 
towards the “in group” broadcasting the message. In other words, television is a tool that can 
knock down, but it cannot build back up. Considering the work done in political science as well 
as in fields such as psychology demonstrating the importance of emotions in how humans make 
decisions as to how to react to stimuli, and the precedence that negative emotions have in this 
decision making process, it is further expected that viewership of non-news programs will lead 
respondents to feel negatively towards the out-groups featured in those programs without any 
corresponding positive feelings towards the groups diametrically opposed to those out-groups 
(Carter, Stamm and Heintz-Knowles 1992; Damasio 2003; Gunnell 2007; Lodge, McGraw and 
Stroh 1989; Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau 1995; Lodge, Stroh and Wahlke 1990 McCombs 
1999; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Martin 2008; Miller 2007; Mutz 2007; Zajonc 
1980).  This leads to four hypotheses that will be tested using this experimental design: 
H1.  Exposure to religious media should increase negative feelings towards homosexuals, and 
exposure to satirical media should not affect feelings towards homosexuals.    
H1A.  Subjects viewing The 700 Club video should have a lower mean Feeling Towards 
Homosexuals score than subjects viewing the Local News video. 
H1B.  Subjects viewing The Daily Show video should have the same mean Feeling Towards 
Homosexuals score as subjects viewing the Local News video. 
 
H2. Exposure to religious media should increase antipathy for gay marriage, and exposure to 
satirical media should not affect feelings towards gay marriage. 
H2A. Subjects viewing The 700 Club video should have a lower mean Support For Same-
Sex Marriage score than subjects viewing the Local News video  
H2B.  Subjects viewing The Daily Show video should have the same mean Support For 
Same-Sex Marriage score as subjects viewing the Local News video. 
 
H3.  Exposure to religious media should not affect feelings towards the Church of Latter-Day 
Saints (CLDS), and exposure to satirical media should increase negative feelings towards the 
CLDS. 
H3A.  Subjects viewing The 700 Club video should have the same mean Feeling Towards 
CLDS score as subjects viewing the Local News video. 
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H3B.  Subjects viewing The Daily Show video should have a lower mean Feeling Towards 
CLDS score than subjects viewing the Local News video. 
 
H4.  Exposure to religious media should not affect feelings towards conservative Christians, and 
exposure to satirical media should increase negative feelings conservative Christians. 
H4A.  Subjects viewing The 700 Club video should have the same mean Feelings Towards 
Conservative Christians score as subjects viewing the Local News video. 
H4B.  Subjects viewing The Daily Show video should have a lower mean Feelings Towards 
Conservative Christians score than subjects viewing the Local News video. 
 
The testing of the hypotheses was conducted in two stages. For each treatment, there was 
one level of analysis where all respondents exposed to a given treatment were analyzed. There 
was a second level of analysis where respondents were grouped by partisan affiliation.  The two 
levels of analysis enables the researcher-and the readers of this dissertation-to explore first 
whether there is a more general effect from consuming non-news programs with political 
messages, and secondly, whether there is also partisanship-determined effect that comes from 
consuming such messages. The second stage of analysis also allows for the researcher to 
determine whether the general effects of consuming non-news programs with political messages 
are, in fact, being driven by the partisanship of the viewing audience. 
Data 
In total there were 175 respondents in the experimental design coming from MTurk. 
MTurk workers were financially compensated for their participation, being paid $0.25 for their 
completion of the survey17. Of the 175 respondents, roughly 63% returned surveys completed in 
their entirety, and there is an n of 110 completed surveys. A total of 134 respondents were 
exposed to one of the three treatments. Many respondents answered the questions of interest to 
                                                 
17
 As referenced in Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012, MTurk can be used to route workers to 
surveys hosted on other online sources, such as Qualtrics, and that is what was done for this 
dissertation. MTurk workers were provided with the same randomized, two-digit code and 
timestamp, and provided this to the author. Payment was then authorized for the MTurk workers. 
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this dissertation, but skipped over questions that were not analyzed. Excluding these respondents 
from analysis serves little utility. Analysis conducted on all returned surveys, rather than simply 
the completed surveys, is therefore presented in this dissertation18. Earlier, published studies that 
have used experimental designs to measure media effects used sample sizes of less than 100; 85 
respondents were used in Iyengar’s 1987 article, and only 28 to 29 respondents were used in 
Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder’s 1982 article. More recent published works in the media effects 
literature have used much larger groups. Recent published works include sample sizes of 468 
(Miller 2007) and 919 (Norris and Sanders) being used in some designs.  Experimental designs 
most similar to the one utilized in this dissertation have used sample sizes of 135 (Forgette and 
Morris 2006) and 157 (Hayes 2008).  It is safe to say that the present work’s sample size will be 
sufficient to derive generalizable, relevant results. 
 Among respondents who completed the entire survey, 36 received the satirical treatment, 
41 received the religious treatment and 33 received the local news/control treatment.  Among all 
respondents who received one of the three treatments, 50 received the religious treatment, 45 
received the satirical treatment and 39 received the local news/control treatment. The average 
age for respondents is 36.  The age of respondents runs from a low of 18 years old to a high of 67 
years old. Partisanship among respondents skews more Democratic than the national average, 
                                                 
18
 Analysis was also conducted on only the 110 surveys that were completed in their entirety. 
Apart from exposure to The Daily Show leading to more positive feelings towards CLDS among 
Republican respondents, albeit not at a statistically significant level, there were no statistically 
significant differences between the analysis conducted on only those surveys completed in their 
entirety and those surveys where questions of interest were answered, but the surveys were not 
completed. 
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with 30.83% of respondents considering themselves to be Republican or leaning Republican, 
9.02% considering themselves Independent and 60.15% Democratic or leaning Democratic.19 
The dependent variable used to test for feelings towards homosexuals is a 100-point 
feeling thermometer, where respondents were told to place the thermometer on a scale of “0” 
(lowest) to “100” (highest) to gauge their feelings towards homosexuals20. Analysis of the pool 
of respondents reveals significant findings (See Table 3.1). 
  
                                                 
19
 Recent (2011) national polls showed the partisan split of the United States to be 31% 
Democratic, 27% Republican and 40% Independent (Jones 2012). 
 
20
 One possible point of confusion due to the way the feeling thermometers are numbered (0-
100) is that some respondents may have intended to indicate the strongest possible displeasure 
for a group by leaving the feeling thermometer at “0” and other respondents may simply have not 
answered the question at all. 
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Table 3.1. Comparison of Mean “Feelings Toward Homosexuals” Scores 
Media 
(Video) n 
Mean 
(std. err.) 
Difference 
from Local 
News mean Hypothesisa 
t-statistic 
(p-value) 
Religious 
(The 700 Club) 48 
45.688 
(4.287) –17.424 
H1A 
H0: Diff ≥ 0 
–2.490 
(.0076) 
Local News 
(KCRA 3 News) 36 
63.111 
(5.702) --- --- --- 
Satirical 
(The Daily Show) 43 
63.302 
(5.035) 0.191 
H1B 
H0: Diff = 0 
0.025 
(.9799) 
      
Democrats and 
Democrat-leaning 
independents only 
     
Religious 
(The 700 Club) 27 
52.481 
(5.753) –22.475 
H1A 
H0: Diff ≥ 0 
–2.490 
(.0043) 
Local News 
(KCRA 3 News) 23 
74.957 
(5.807) --- --- --- 
Satirical 
(The Daily Show) 27 
65.957 
(6.374) –9.253 
H1B 
H0: Diff = 0 
–1.062 
(.2945) 
      
Republicans and 
Republican-leaning 
independents only 
     
Religious 
(The 700 Club) 16 
34.375 
(5.992) –17.514 
H1A 
H0: Diff ≥ 0 
–1.271 
(.2200) 
Local News 
(KCRA 3 News) 9 
51.889 
(11.001) --- --- --- 
Satirical 
(The Daily Show) 12 
59.500 
(9.154) 7.6111 
H1B 
H0: Diff = 0 
0.519 
(.6102) 
a 
 
 
Both H1A and H1B difference-in-means tests assume equal variances. ; p-values for equal variance F-tests 
are .2880 for H1A and .6386 for H1B. For Democrats only, they are .9700 and .7534, respectively.  For 
Republicans only they are .3573 and .8743, respectively.  
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 Compared to the control group--respondents exposed to the local news clip discussing 
Proposition 8--respondents exposed to the clip of religious media have statistically significantly 
lower opinions towards homosexuals. Using a two-sample t-test with equal variances, the 
difference in means drops from an average of 63 for respondents exposed to local news to an 
average approximately 46 for respondents exposed to the clip from The 700 Club (See Table 
3.1).  When the partisanship of the respondents is taken into consideration, exposure to the clip 
from The 700 Club is still shown to demonstrate stronger antipathy towards homosexuals than 
found in the control group. Most striking is the fact that there is a large and statistically 
significant drop in feelings towards homosexuals among Democrats who view the clip from The 
700 Club (See Table 3.1). Democratic respondents exposed to the local news clip had an average 
feeling thermometer score of 75 towards homosexuals, while Democrats exposed to the clip from 
The 700 Club reported an average feeling score of 52. This 23-point difference is statistically 
significant at the .01 level (See Table 3.1). Republicans exposed to local news have lower mean 
feelings towards homosexuals-a mean score of approximately 52-than Democrats exposed to 
either The 700 Club or to those exposed to local news. Republicans exposed to The 700 Club 
have an even lower mean score towards homosexuals, approximately 34, but the difference 
between Republicans exposed to local news and Republicans exposed to The 700 Club was not 
found to be statistically significant at the .05 level (See Table 3.1). It should be noted that, even 
while not significant at the .05 level, the difference between the control group and the test group 
still moved in the appropriate direction to support Hypothesis 1. Coupled with the significant 
findings when respondents are not examined according to party, as well as the significant 
differences found between Democrats who were placed in the control group and Democrats 
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exposed to The 700 Club, it can be said that analysis of the homosexual feeling thermometer has 
yielded significant support for Hypothesis 1. 
Feelings towards homosexuals was also used as a dependent variable during multivariate 
analysis. In an ordinary least squares model, exposure to The 700 Club, partisanship--where 
Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents were coded “-1,” Independents coded “0,” 
and Democrats and Democratic-leaning Independents were coded “1,”--age--an interval variable 
where respondents wrote in their age--and religiosity--an additive variable using questions 
asking respondents as to their church attendance and their belief in Biblical literalism--were used 
as independent variables as a way to test for the impact that exposure to The 700 Club had upon 
views towards homosexuals while still controlling for other pertinent factors. As Table 3.2 
demonstrates, even when additional controls were added, exposure to The 700 Club resulted in 
statistically significantly lowered feelings towards homosexuals. At the .05 level, exposure to 
The 700 Club resulted in a 17.6 point difference in feelings towards homosexuals, controlling for 
the respondents’ partisan affiliation, age, and religiosity. Unexpectedly, exposure to The 700 
Club also led to significantly lower feelings towards The Church of Latter-Day Saints. As Table 
3.4 indicates, this decrease is most pronounced in Democratic and Independent respondents. 
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Table 3.2. OLS and Logit Estimations 
  Cofficient estimate (std. err.) by estimation type and dependent variable 
Independent 
Variable  
OLS 
Feelings 
towards gays 
Logit 
Not opposed to 
gay marriage 
OLS 
Feelings 
towards CLDS 
OLS 
Feelings toward 
conservative 
Christians 
Constant  82.928 (14.078) 
2.003  
(1.130) 
11.765 
(10.844) 
18.147 
(11.116) 
Religious 
treatment 
dummy 
 
 –17.641 
(7.098) 
p = .014 
 –1.140 
(0.586) 
p =.052 
 –13.822 
(5.387) 
p = .012 
3.646 
(5.487)  
p = .832 
Satirical 
treatment 
dummy 
 
–2.072 
(7.069)  
p = .770 
–0.816 
(0.588)  
p = .544 
–1.218 
(5.380)  
p = .821 
1.166 
(5.487)  
p = .832 
Democrat 
dummy  
8.707 
(10.659)  
p = .416 
1.720 
(0.828)  
p = .038 
–1.788 
(8.164)  
p = .827 
–10.378  
(8.362)  
p = .217 
Republican 
dummy  
–6.872 
(11.386)  
p = .547 
–6.872 
(11.386)  
p = .547 
14.647 
(8.665)  
p = .094 
12.087 
(8.880)  
p = .176 
Religiosity  
–3.220 
(1.644)  
p = .053 
–0.374 
(0.137)  
p = .006 
4.353 
(1.258)  
p = .053 
10.427 
(1.286)  
p = .000 
Age  
–0.426 
 (0.208)  
p = .043 
–0.035 
 (0.017)  
p = .039 
0.350 
 (0.162)  
p = .033 
0.104 
 (0.165)  
p = .532 
n  116 119 115 116 
Adj. R2  .172 .265 .227 .464 
F, χ2   4.99 43.53 6.59 17.56 
Note: 
 
 
p –values are for two-tailed tests. F-statistics are shown for the OLS regressions, and the χ2-statistic is 
shown for the Logit regression. The Adjusted R2 shown for the Logit regression is the pseudo-R2 estimated 
by Stata.   
 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that exposure to The 700 Club should result in decreased support 
for same-sex marriage and that exposure to The Daily Show should not have a statistically 
significant impact on support for same-sex marriage. Support for same-sex marriage was gauged 
in the post-screening series of questions using a five-point ordinal variable where respondents 
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were asked as to how strongly they agreed/disagreed with a statement saying that same-sex 
marriages should have the same rights and legal recognition as traditional marriages. This 
variable was then converted into a binomial variable whereby respondents expressing support for 
gay marriage were coded as “1” and those opposed to gay marriage were coded as “0.” Using a 
Pearson’s chi-square test, it was found that respondents who were exposed to The 700 Club were 
significantly less likely to support gay marriage than respondents who were exposed to the local 
news clip (See Table 3.3).  When examining whether party played a role in respondents views 
towards gay marriage, both Democrats and Republicans who were exposed to The 700 Club 
were less likely to support gay marriage than those exposed to the local news clip (See Table 
3.3).  
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Table 3.3. Comparison of Proportions of Subjects Opposed to Gay Marriage 
Media 
(Video) n 
Pct. (No.) 
opposed to 
gay marriagea 
Difference 
from Local 
News pct. Hypothesis 
z-statistic 
(p-value) 
Religious 
(The 700 Club) 49 
53.06 
(26) 21.48 
H2A 
H0: Diff ≤ 0 
2.004 
(.0225) 
Local News 
(KCRA 3 News) 38 
31.58 
(12) --- --- --- 
Satirical 
(The Daily Show) 43 
44.19 
(19) 12.61 
H2B 
H0: Diff = 0 
1.165 
(.2440) 
      
Democrats and 
Democrat-leaning 
independents only 
     
Religious 
(The 700 Club) 28 
39.29 
(11) 22.62 
H2A 
H0: Diff ≤ 0 
1.795  
(.0363) 
Local News 
(KCRA 3 News) 24 
16.67 
(4)  --- --- 
Satirical 
(The Daily Show) 27 
22.22 
(6) 5.56 
H2B 
H0: Diff = 0 
0.499 
(.6179) 
      
Republicans and 
Republican-leaning 
independents only 
     
Religious 
(The 700 Club) 16 
75.00 
(12) 15.00 
H2A 
H0: Diff ≤ 0 
0.806 
(.2101) 
Local News 
(KCRA 3 News 10 
60.00 
(6)  --- --- 
Satirical 
(The Daily Show) 12 
83.33 
(10) 23.33 
H2B 
H0: Diff = 0 
1.224 
(.2211) 
      
Independents      
Religious 
(The 700 Club) 4 
75.00 
(3) 25.00 
H2A 
H0: Diff ≤ 0 
0.730 
(.2326) 
Local News 
(KCRA 3 News) 4 
50.00 
(2) --- --- --- 
Satirical 
(The Daily Show) 4 
75.00 
(3) 25.00 
H2B 
H0: Diff = 0 
0.730 
(.4652) 
a 
 
Percent of subjects answering either “Disagree” or “Strongly Disagree” to the statement “Marriages between 
same-sex couples should be recognized by the law as valid, with the same rights as traditional marriages.   
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Among Democrats this decrease in support for gay marriage was, as seen when analyzing 
Democrats’ feelings towards homosexuals after exposure to The 700 Club, statistically 
significant. Among Republicans, the decrease was again not found to be significant. A logit 
model which incorporated the same controls in testing for the impact of exposure to religious 
media on feelings towards same-sex marriage found that exposure to The 700 Club again 
resulted in statistically significant movement in the expected direction (See Table 3.2). 
Testing the impact of consuming satirical media produces statistically insignificant 
results. Exposure to The Daily Show does not increase positive feelings among Democrats--or 
non-Democrats--towards homosexuals or towards gay marriage (See Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). 
We do not see Democrats moving favorably towards gay marriage or towards homosexuals upon 
exposure to The Daily Show. In fact, there is a drop in feelings towards both homosexuals and 
towards gay marriage among Democrats after exposure to The Daily Show, although this 
movement is statistically insignificant (See Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). Exposure to The Daily Show 
produced mixed and statistically insignificant results among Republicans, with Republicans 
being exposed to the satirical media treatment having slightly warmer feelings towards 
homosexuals than those in the control group (See Table 3.1), but being less likely to support gay 
marriage (Table 3.3). 
 As to the impact of The Daily Show increasing out-group alienation towards the groups 
targeted for ridicule or scorn in the context of its comedy--in this case, conservative Christians 
and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints--among Democrats results again move in the 
predicted directions, but fail to reach statistical significance (See Tables 3.4 and 3.5).  
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Table 3.4 Comparison of Mean “Feelings Toward the Church of Latter-Day Saints” 
Scores 
Media 
(Video) n 
Mean 
(std. err.) 
Difference 
from Local 
News mean Hypothesisa 
t-statistic 
(p-value) 
Religious 
(The 700 Club) 47 
26.404 
(3.327) –7.380 
H3A 
H0: Diff = 0 
–1.362 
(.1768) 
Local News 
(KCRA 3 News) 37 
33.784 
(4.408) --- --- --- 
Satirical 
(The Daily Show) 42 
34.405 
(4.147) 0.621 
H3B 
H0: Diff ≥ 0 
0.102 
(.5406) 
      
Democrats and 
Democrat-leaning 
independents only 
     
Religious 
(The 700 Club) 26 
23.115 
(5.753) –9.754 
H3A 
H0: Diff = 0 
–1.313 
(.1967) 
Local News 
(KCRA 3 News) 23 
32.870 
(6.168) --- --- --- 
Satirical 
(The Daily Show) 26 
25.423 
(6.374) –7.447 
H3B 
H0: Diff ≥ 0 
–1.020 
(.1872) 
      
Republicans and 
Republican-leaning 
independents only 
     
Religious 
(The 700 Club) 16 
34.750 
(5.992) –2.550 
H3A 
H0: Diff = 0 
–0.340 
(.7369) 
Local News 
(KCRA 3 News) 10 
37.300 
(3.792) --- --- --- 
Satirical 
(The Daily Show) 12 
56.667 
(8.604) 19.367 
H3B 
H0: Diff ≥ 0 
2.060 
(.9714) 
      
Independents only      
Religious 
(The 700 Club) 4 
14.500 
(8.190) –15.750 
H3A 
H0: Diff = 0 
–0.707 
(.5191) 
Local News 
(KCRA 3 News) 4 
30.250 
(20.72) --- --- --- 
Satirical 
(The Daily Show) 4 
26.000 
(12.40) –4.250 
H3B 
H0: Diff ≥ 0 
–0.176 
(.4330) 
a 
 
 
 
Equal-variance difference-in-means t-tests are conducted if the p-value for the equal variance F-test is < .20; 
otherwise unequal-variances t-tests are conducted.  F-tests p-values are .2990 for H3A and .9711 for H3B. 
For Democrats-only, they are .1045 and .0592, respectively.  For Republicans-only they are .0249 and .0108, 
respectively.  
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Table 3.5 Comparison of Mean “Feelings Toward Conservative Christian” Scores 
Media 
(Video) n 
Mean 
(std. err.) 
Difference 
from Local 
News mean Hypothesisa 
t-statistic 
(p-value) 
Religious 
(The 700 Club) 47 
44.745 
 (4.819) –8.340 
H4A 
H0: Diff = 0 
–1.244 
(.2170) 
Local News 
(KCRA 3 News) 37 
36.405 
(4.423) --- --- --- 
Satirical 
(The Daily Show) 43 
39.535 
 (4.928) 3.130 
H4B 
H0: Diff ≥ 0 
0.466 
(.6788) 
      
Democrats and 
Democrat-leaning 
independents only 
     
Religious 
(The 700 Club) 26 
33.346 
(5.954) –0.045 
H4A 
H0: Diff = 0 
–0.005 
(.9958) 
Local News 
(KCRA 3 News) 23 
33.391 
(6.174) --- --- --- 
Satirical 
(The Daily Show) 27 
30.926 
(5.557) –2.465 
H4B 
H0: Diff ≥ 0 
–0.297 
(.3837) 
      
Republicans and 
Republican-leaning 
independents only 
     
Religious 
(The 700 Club) 16 
60.625 
(5.992) 15.825 
H4A 
H0: Diff = 0 
1.506 
(.1450) 
Local News 
(KCRA 3 News) 10 
44.800 
(6.081) --- --- --- 
Satirical 
(The Daily Show) 12 
65.250 
(8.307) 20.450 
H4B 
H0: Diff ≥ 0 
1.915 
(.9651) 
      
Independents only      
Religious 
(The 700 Club) 4 
61.250 
(20.67) 28.500 
H4A 
H0: Diff = 0 
1.132 
(.3007) 
Local News 
(KCRA 3 News) 4 
32.750 
(14.36) --- --- --- 
Satirical 
(The Daily Show) 4 
20.500 
(11.86) –12.250 
H4B 
H0: Diff ≥ 0 
–0.658  
(.2674) 
a 
 
 
Equal-variance difference-in-means t-tests are conducted if the p-value for the equal variance F-test is < .20; 
otherwise unequal-variances t-tests are conducted.  F-tests p-values are .2041 for H4A and .2640 for H4B. 
For Democrats-only, they are .9112 and .8945, respectively.  For Republicans-only they are .2001 and .2362, 
respectively.  
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The dependent variables used in this series of tests are 100-point feeling thermometers 
where respondents were told to place on a scale of “0” (lowest) to “100” (warmest) their feelings 
towards The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and conservative Christians, 
respectively. It is worth noting that Republicans exposed to the satirical media treatment grew 
more fond of both conservative Christians and of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, although this movement is only marginally (at the .10 level) significant (See Tables 3.4 
and 3.5). It is possible that there is a kind of “backlash” effect that comes from being exposed to 
television programs that explicitly mock or ridicule one’s beliefs or one’s peer group.  
Conclusion 
 Exposure to the religious media treatment resulted in statistically significantly lower 
feelings towards homosexuals and towards gay marriage among Democrats, but not Republicans. 
Why might this be so? Readers should recall the strong link between televangelism and the tent 
revivals of the early-to-mid 20th Century. The purpose of conducting revivals was not to “preach 
to the choir,” but to win new converts and bring those who were unchurched or who had fallen 
away from religion back into regular church attendance (Harrell 1985). It is thus possible that Pat 
Robertson’s message is not tailored to be most persuasive among Republicans--who already had 
fairly negative opinions towards homosexuals and gay marriage--but among Democrats who had 
minimal experience in being exposed to that sort of rhetoric. Readers should also bear in mind 
that Pat Robertson is a highly charismatic21 man who has had a great deal of success over his 
four-decade long broadcasting career. It therefore stands to reason that those who have never 
heard Robertson’s message before could find themselves, at least momentarily, swayed by 
                                                 
21
 The word “charismatic” is here being used in the secular sense, meaning, “exercising a 
compelling charm that inspires devotion in others.” 
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Robertson’s appeals to national unity and his claim that no nation that has promoted 
homosexuality has endured. Similarly, Democratic respondents may have been familiar with The 
Daily Show and already held crystallized opinions towards Mormons and Christian 
conservatives. As such, Stewart’s ridicule of these groups presented the respondents with nothing 
unfamiliar and thus failed to “move the dial.”  The fact that neither treatment caused statistically 
significant increased warmth towards in-groups bolsters the argument of this dissertation that 
television does little to increase positive feelings, but much to increase alienation and mistrust of 
societal “others.” 
 As with any experimental design, there may be questions about the external validity of 
the results. The reasons for the statistical significance in consuming the religious media 
treatment, but not the satirical media treatment, could be contingent upon the vagaries of this 
particular pool of respondents. In order to demonstrate the broad generalizability of the central 
theses of this dissertation, the following chapter explores the impact of consuming non-news 
programming with political messaging--again religious and satirical television--by analyzing 
large-n, nationally collected cross-sectional data. 
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CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS OF CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA 
 
Chapter Three presented results of an experimental design demonstrating that 
respondents exposed to religious media had increased antipathy towards targeted social out-
groups. Chapter Three also presented mixed results regarding the consumption of satirical media. 
Having utilized an experimental design to explore the impact of consuming non-news programs 
that contain political messages, this dissertation now looks to test these results with larger 
samples in a less controlled setting. In order to test the external validity of the last chapter’s 
findings, this chapter uses large-n cross-sectional data to test four hypotheses. It is expected that 
increased exposure to satirical media and religious media will be correlated with increased 
antipathy towards targeted out-groups. However, it is anticipated that there will be no 
corresponding increased warm feelings towards liberal groups or public figures associated with 
increased consumption of satirical media. It will additionally be demonstrated that consumers of 
religious media are not necessarily members of The Religious Right by demonstrating 
distinctions between consumers of religious media and agreement with planks of the Republican 
Party platform. 
What is a Religious Television “Viewer,” and What is “Viewing”? 
Despite the great changes in the world of mass media in the past thirty years, it still 
stands to reason that the religious television viewer remains distinct from the viewers of the 
various flavors of non-religious television. Academic work following Gerbner et al. (1984) 
explores the question of who consumes religious media, and has found that the consumer of 
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religious media is distinct from the general public in several notable ways (Abelman 1987a; 
Hoover 1987; Pettersson 1986). This work shall demonstrate not only that the consumer of 
religious media is distinct from the general public, but that it is due to their consumption of 
religious television that they are distinct. It will also be demonstrated that consumers of satirical 
television possess socio-demographic factors differentiating themselves from the American 
public, generally, but also different attitudes. Again, it will be demonstrated that it is the 
consumption of the satirical television messages that causes the viewer to hold these distinct 
views. Viewers of satirical media have been found to be generally younger, better educated, 
more likely to be urban and more affluent than the general public (Baumgartner and Morris 
2006; Cantor 1999; Cao 2008; Carr 1992; Fox and Sahin 2007; Hart and Hartelius 2007; Holbert 
et al. 2007; Hollander 2005; LaMarre et al. 2009; Young and Esralew 2011) but there has been 
no study akin to Gerbner et al. (1984) proffering that there exists an entire “satirical 
mainstream,” to act as a basis of comparison. There is also no question about how to define a 
“viewer” of satirical television. This is not the case with religious television. 
There are a few hurdles facing the researcher who wishes to measure attributes among 
those who watch religious television in the United States. Some of these hurdles do not exist in 
such treacherous form for those wishing to study the media effects of other television broadcasts, 
such as the other subject of this dissertation, satirical media. These hurdles include the fact that 
religious television programming has proven controversial. In order to minimize--or inflate--the 
influence of religious broadcasters, detractors and televangelists each had a vested interest in the 
number of viewers of religious television. This made the total number of viewers of religious 
television a contentious political point. Another hurdle is defining what is meant by “religious 
programming,” given the wide variety of television shows that can be considered religious. 
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Finally, there is also the difficulty of answering the first question that must be addressed: what is 
a “viewer?” 
A problem that has vexed researchers is simply determining what constitutes “viewing” 
in a basic, empirical sense. While reliable numbers can be obtained in terms of how many 
religious television channels, radio stations and television programs exist (Stacey and Shupe 
1982), more ticklish is the matter of determining how many viewers of religious broadcasting 
there are. The basic question that must be tackled is, how much religious broadcasting does one 
have to view in order to be classified as someone who views religious broadcasting? Estimates 
have varied from under 10 million Americans to over 100 million Americans (Horsfield 1984; 
Hoover 1987; Stacey and Shupe 1982). It should be kept in mind, too, that the size of the 
audience for The Electronic Church is a somewhat controversial subject. Just as critics and 
detractors of The Electronic Church want to minimize the influence of religious television, 
supporters of religious television--the televangelists themselves, in particular--have an interest in 
claiming a much larger audience share than they may actually command (Abelman and 
Neuendorf 1987; Horsfield 1984; Hughey 1990). A recent (April, 2001) Pew Research Center 
poll indicated that 49% of all Americans watched religious television, or listened to religious 
radio shows, “at least sometimes,” with 20% listening “frequently.” 16% stated they “hardly 
ever” watched religious television or listened to religious radio shows, with only 34% saying 
they never listened to or watched religious broadcasting (Pew Research Center 2001). The very 
different numbers produced when trying to determine the audience for religious media come in 
no small part from the very different ways used in calculating how much time one has to report 
watching religious broadcasting in order to be classified as a “viewer.” 
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 The A.C. Nielsen Company, in their 1985 survey commissioned by Pat Robertson’s 
Christian Broadcasting Network, defined someone as a “viewer” of religious broadcasting if they 
watched six minutes or more of such programming in a month, while two academic studies only 
defined someone as a viewer of religious broadcasting if they watched fifteen or more minutes of 
such programming in a week (Hoover 1987). While researchers have made headway into 
understanding the demographic characteristics of the audience of religious broadcasting, one 
thing that is not clear is just how many Americans actually view religious broadcasting. Even 
keeping these difficulties in mind, reliable estimates for the number of Americans watching 
religious programming still put the number of viewers around 15-20 million Americans a week 
(Bruce 1990; Green 1992; Hoover 1987). This is a significant bloc of the United States 
population. 
The GSS data utilized for the present study defines viewership in terms of how many 
hours and minutes a week a respondent watches “religious shows on television.” Rather than 
dealing with the difficult matter of defining someone as a “viewer” of religious programming, 
analysis can be performed in order to see relationships between increased viewership of religious 
broadcasting and the holding of specific beliefs and attitudes. By focusing on whether or not 
watching more religious programming makes one more or less likely to hold certain beliefs, the 
dissertation does not need to address head-on the more difficult question of assigning the label of 
“viewer” to someone who watches religious programming based on how often they watch 
religious programming. 
The question as to how to define someone as being a “viewer” of religious programming 
is related to another difficulty in attempting to examine the consumption of religious media; the 
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multitude of religious programming that is being treated as the monolithic concept, “religious 
programming.”  As Abelman (1987) discusses: 
“Religious fare consists of just about every popular secular programming genre, 
including talk shows (“The 700 Club”), game shows (“Bible Bowl”), children’s shows (“Davy 
and Goliath”), soap operas (“Another Life”), news-magazine shows (“Reel to Real”), sports 
programming (“Athletes in Action”) and music/variety shows (“PTL Club”) (Abelman 1987; 
200)22 
 
Viney (1999) and Park and Baker (2007) each provide more recent breakdowns of this 
wide variety of religious programming, and the respective audiences for each type of religious 
television program. Due to the somewhat distinct nature of the television industry in the United 
Kingdom23--the area of focus for Viney (1999)--an in depth analysis of Viney (1999) would 
provide more diversion than insight as to the areas of interest for this dissertation. More utility 
will be derived from exploring Park and Baker (2007) and their exploration of religious media in 
the American context. Park and Baker (2007) analyze the variety of religious programs and 
theatrically released motion pictures--among other forms of media--and find some distinguishing 
features between those who consume the distinct forms of religious television programs. To 
provide an example of the diverse forms of religious mass media and their audiences, it was 
demonstrated that viewers of Touched by an Angel were more likely to be older, female and far 
less likely to be well educated than those who viewed the Mel Gibson film The Passion of the 
Christ. Overall, respondents were more likely to have viewed more mainstream programs on 
                                                 
22
 See also Straub (1988) and the discussion on Pat Robertson’s CBN founding a news program 
and a soap opera; pgs. 72-74, 82-87 
23
 Including, but not limited to, state ownership of the major television networks in the United 
Kingdom, the lack of any strictly religious television networks and the fact that religious 
programs must conform to the ITC Programme Code. It still warrants mentioning that Svennevig 
et al. (1988), which also looked at the audiences for religious programming in the UK, found that 
viewers of religious programming tended to be older and female. Viney (1999) also found that 
the most popular religious program, Songs of Praise had an older audience. 
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network television such as Seventh Heaven, Touched by an Angel or Joan of Arcadia than have 
watched charismatic faith-healer--and former regent of Oral Roberts University (Bransetter 
2007)--Benny Hinn’s cable-only broadcast, This is Your Day. Unsurprisingly, mothers were most 
likely to have viewed the direct-to-video children’s series VeggieTales (Park and Baker 2007).  
In short, this study is trying to deal with a broad swath of programs as a singular entity. While it 
seems difficult to imagine that someone who would not otherwise watch religious programming 
would make sure to tune into Another Life, it would have been beneficial to have been presented 
with data that would allow a researcher to distinguish just what sorts of religious programs the 
consumers of religious media are consuming. There are studies that addressed the content and 
format of religious television programs, but it would be presumptuous to assume that the figures 
presented in their work would be determinative of the formats viewed by the respondents in the 
GSS survey data (Abelman and Neuendorf 1987; Hadden and Swann 1981 Park and Baker 2007; 
Viney 1999). 
The final hurdle in trying to collect data on the American public’s use of religious 
broadcasting is what, exactly, constitutes use (Abelman 1987a). Hoover (1987) confronts the 
issue of trying to distinguish the quality of viewing and participation.  Involvement in religious 
broadcasting, more than other types of media, can be seen as more than simply viewing the 
programs. As Hoover explains: 
 “Some contributors and ‘members’, seem not to view much at all, but can also articulate 
their sense of identification by contributing, subscribing to publications, attending local meetings 
of support groups for the broadcasters, traveling to the center where the program is produced, 
and participating in allied ministries and activities promoted by the broadcasts…Simply put, the 
measures of viewing most often used to assess the “audience” of the “Electronic Church” are 
totally inadequate to assess the depth and quality of the viewing experience, and are thus poorly 
fitted to the task of explaining the overall “impact” of religious broadcasting in any detail.” 
(Hoover 1987; 148) 
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Thus, there is also the matter of intensity of viewership, something not regularly of 
concern in terms of media studies. Generally speaking one is or is not a viewer of a particular 
television program. When that program is built around exhortations for contributions, however, 
and indeed, when the lifeblood of the televangelist’s ministry is receiving contributions from 
viewers, it would be of interest as to what proportion of viewers actually contribute to the 
ministry. Unfortunately, the GSS data upon which this study relies never asks, specifically, 
whether or not respondents contributed money to televangelists or religious media figures.24 
Hypotheses 
 Exposure to non-news programs that contain political messages should result in increased 
antipathy towards the out-groups mentioned in those broadcasts. As was mentioned in previous 
chapters, this expectation stems from an understanding of videomalaise theory and its progeny 
(Dahl 1967; Forgette and Morris 2006; Martin 2008; Mutz 2007; Mutz and Reeves 2005; 
Robinson1976).  It is not anticipated that the increased antipathy towards the out-groups derided 
in the broadcasts will be accompanied by a corresponding increase in positive feelings towards 
the apparent “in group” from whom the messages are being broadcast; specifically, it is not 
anticipated that watching satirical media will lead to stronger positive feelings towards liberal 
public figures or groups. In order to demonstrate that consumers of religious media are not 
simply socially conservative, Christian members of the Republican Party, it will also be 
demonstrated that consuming higher levels of religious media does not correlate significantly 
with support for specific planks of the Republican Party’s platform. 
                                                 
24
 The GSS did ask how much one contributed to “other religious organizations” and to one’s 
own congregation during the same time span as they asked regarding the consumption of 
religious broadcasts. However, no statistical significance was found between the amount of time 
one spends watching religious media and one’s generosity in contributing to “other religious 
organizations” or to one’s own congregation. 
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H1: Higher levels of religious media consumption will result in stronger antipathy towards the 
out-groups targeted by religious media; 
H2: Higher level of religious media consumption will not be significantly correlated with 
Republican Party platform positions such as opposition to gun control, support for the 
death penalty and support for The Drug War; 
H3: Higher levels of satirical media consumption will result in stronger antipathy towards 
conservative public figures and social groups; 
H4: Higher levels of satirical media consumption will not be significantly correlated with 
positive feelings towards liberal public figures or groups. 
Data and Methods 
In addition to the experiment discussed in the last chapter, this dissertation will also 
feature statistical analysis of large, nationally conducted surveys. The data on the consumption of 
religious television was assembled and provided by General Social Survey (GSS) of the National 
Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago in their General Social Surveys 
Cumulative file, 1972-2010. This file provides a total of 55,087 completed interviews with adults 
in the United States for analysis, though questions pertaining to watching religious television--
“About how much time per week, in hours and minutes, do you normally spend watching 
religious shows on television?”--were only asked in the time periods 1988-1991 and again in 
1998; a total of 5,813 respondents were asked about watching religious television. Controls for 
the respondents’ relevant socio-demographic characteristics--including their partisanship, 
ideological preferences, age, gender, income and whether respondents lived in an urban or rural 
area--are included in the linear regression models utilized in testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. Age, 
gender, residing in a rural area and income have all previously been demonstrated to be 
correlated with increased religiosity (Argue, Johnson and White 1999; Chalfant and Heller 1991; 
Joshi, Hardy and Hawkins 2009; Miller and Hoffman 1995).  Age is an interval variable where 
respondents are asked their age in years. Gender is a binomial variable coded “1” for male and 
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“2” for female. Whether the respondent is from an urban or rural environment is controlled for 
using the variable “xnorcsiz,” an ordinal variable where respondents could choose the size of the 
city where they reside, from “large central city (over 250,000),” coded “1” to “open country 
within larger civil divisions, e.g., township, division,” coded “10.” Income was controlled for 
using the ordinal variable, “Income,” where respondents were asked to place their total family 
income from all sources before taxes for the last year on a scale running from “Under $1,000,” 
coded as “1” to “$60,000 or over,” coded as “20.”25 Controlling for partisanship and ideology 
ensures that the statistical analysis is not simply capturing the views of “The Religious Right.” 
Partisanship is controlled for using the variable “partyid,” an ordinal variable where respondents 
were asked whether they viewed themselves anywhere from “Strong Democrat,” coded “0,” to 
“Strong Republican,” coded “7.” Ideology was controlled for using the ordinal variable 
“polviews,” where respondents could place themselves on a 7 point scale from “Extremely 
Liberal,” coded “1” to “Extremely Conservative,” coded “7.” Additional tests are also conducted 
to demonstrate how viewers of religious television are distinct from socially conservative 
Republicans.26  
The data on the consumption of satirical television was assembled and provided by the 
Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania in their 2004 NAES 2004 
National Annenberg Election Rolling Cross-Sectional Survey. Ninety eight thousand, seven 
                                                 
25
 For respondents interviewed after 1990, the income brackets were adjusted and the highest, 
still coded as “20” is “$75,000 or over.” 
26
 It needs to be stressed that this dissertation does not aim to be another study of the Religious 
Right. There is already a fine volume of literature on the subject of the Christian Right, much of 
which has proven illuminating in providing proper context while performing the necessary 
research for this dissertation and inspiring some of the theories and hypotheses tested therein 
(Hertzke 1993; Jelen 1993; Klemp 2010;  Lienesch 1982: Rozell and Wilcox 1996; Wilcox 1986; 
2000).  This dissertation is distinct from those works in that it explores the impact media has on 
those Americans who utilize religious television, specifically.  
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hundred and eleven interviews were conduced with adults in the United States during the 
campaign season of 2004 and for two months following the general election. Creating the main 
independent variable of interest, respondents were asked how many days in the past week they 
watched late night comedy programs “like ‘The Late Show with David Letterman’ ‘The Tonight 
Show with Jay Leno’ or ‘The Daily Show with Jon Stewart’.” This is an ordinal variable running 
from 0 to 7. A follow-up question then asked which late night comedy program they most often 
watched: ‘The Late Show with David Letterman’, ‘The Tonight Show with Jay Leno’, ‘The Daily 
Show with Jon Stewart’, ‘Late Night with Conan O’Brien’ or ”Other.” Control variables were 
created from the questions respondents were asked regarding their income, education, age, 
gender, race, partisanship, ideology, frequency of church attendance and whether they lived in an 
urban or rural area. Partisan ID was recoded as a binomial variable27 where Republicans were 
coded as “0” and Democrats were coded as “1.”  Ideology was controlled for using a 5 point 
ordinal scale running from “Very Conservative,” coded as “1” to “Very Liberal,” coded as “5.”28  
Education is a nine-point ordinal scale running from “Grade 8 or lower,” coded as “1” to 
“Graduate or Professional Degree,” coded as “9.” Gender is a binomial variable where males are 
coded as “0” and females are coded as “1.” Age is an interval level variable where the 
respondent gave their age in years. Income is a nine-point ordinal scale where respondents were 
asked to place their last year’s total household income before taxes on a scale of “Less than 
$10,000,” coded as “1,” to “More than $150,000,” coded as “9.” Race is a nominal, five point 
variable where Whites are coded as “1.”  Race is included in the models essentially to check for 
                                                 
27
 Respondents who declared that they were Independents or “Something Else” were excluded 
from the models. 
28
 In the NAES dataset, respondents who said they did not know the answer to a question or who 
refused to answer were coded as 998 and 999, respectively. These responses were not included in 
the models in this dissertation. 
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distinctions between white and non-white respondents. Whether a respondent lives in an urban or 
rural environment is controlled using a 3 point ordinal variable where respondents could choose 
whether they live in an “urban,” coded as “1,” “suburban,” coded as “2” and “rural,” coded as 
“3,” place of residence. 
 One question relevant to both the GSS and NAES datasets was how to code the 
religiosity of the respondents. Both the GSS and NAES ask a series of questions relating to a 
respondents’ religious behavior and denomination. Religiosity is relevant to views towards the 
out-groups targeted both by religious and satirical media, so finding the appropriate way to 
measure religiosity is of the utmost importance. Regarding the use of religious denominations to 
classify respondents, this work follows that of Olson and Warber (2008), Layman (1997) and 
Blazo and Russo (2013). These authors demonstrated that dividing Americans by denomination 
is less useful than observing levels of religious orthodoxy and moral conservatism among the 
adherents, regardless of denominational affiliations. Olson and Warber contend, “Conservative 
Baptists would have more in common politically with conservative Catholics than they would 
with fellow Baptists who are liberal” (Olson and Warber 2008: 193). Keeping this in mind, the 
variable constructed to measure religiosity in the GSS dataset includes a measure of Biblical 
literalism, as well as how often one prays. The use of this dynamic for gauging Christian 
orthodoxy is widespread in the relevant research and provides substantial validity (Bolce and De 
Maio 1999; Olson and Warber 2008; Wilcox 1986). One benefit of using biblical literalism is 
that it provides a crucial cross-denominational cleavage within the Christian majority of 
Americans. Whether the respondent is Protestant, Catholic, or nondenominational, a literal 
interpretation of the Bible implies religious conservatism (Hempel and Bartkowski 2008). 
Additionally, by looking at how the respondent views the Bible, rather than, for example, 
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frequency of attendance to religious services, it is ensured that the measure utilized accounts for 
those who are not only devout in practice, but strict in their beliefs as well (Blazo and Russo 
2013; Layman 1997; Olson and Warber 2008; Scheufele, Nisbet and Brossard 2003). 
Unfortunately, the NAES dataset does not contain questions pertaining to the respondents’ views 
on Biblical literalism or frequency of prayer. As such, frequency of church attendance is used as 
a proxy for a respondents’ religiosity. This is still in keeping with the extant literature in the 
field, including Olson and Warber (2008) and conforms with the assertion that denomination is a 
less useful measure of religious beliefs than outward characteristics of a respondents’ 
religiosity.29 
The Annenberg dataset being analyzed for satirical media effects contains questions that 
allow to control for respondent ideology, income, level of education, age, gender, partisanship, 
race and whether or not the respondents lived in an urban, suburban or rural environment. 
Previous analyses have shown satirical television to be particularly popular among young, well-
educated affluent urbanites, so controlling for these factors is essential (Baumgartner and Morris 
2006; Cantor 1999; Cao 2008; Carr 1992; Fox and Sahin 2007; Hart and Hartelius 2007; Holbert 
et al. 2007; Hollander 2005; LaMarre et al. 2009; Young and Esralew 2011). Controlling for the 
socio-demographic criteria that make one likely to view satirical or religious television programs 
is done to demonstrate that, even among the groups most likely to consume these particular non-
news programs with political messages, the consumption of these messages has an impact on 
their views towards the out-groups targeted during those broadcasts. Controlling for partisanship 
                                                 
29
 It should be kept in mind that the NAES’ question about denomination includes Baptists, 
‘Christians’, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Lutherans, Methodists, Presbyterians and non-denominational 
Christians all coded as “Protestants.” This encompasses some of the most liberal denominations 
in the United States as well as some of the most conservative, particularly when one considers 
that many born again and evangelical Christians eschew labels other than “Christian.” This 
unwieldy measure was thus not included in the models. 
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and ideology will make sure that any results showing respondents’ antipathy towards George W. 
Bush or the National Rife Association is not merely a result of the respondents’ own partisanship 
or political ideology. Relevant to the present study, respondents were also asked about their 
television viewing habits. This includes specific questions regarding the viewing of late-night 
comedy programs such as The Daily Show. Respondents were also asked how much they trusted 
the two candidates running for President in 2004 (President George W. Bush and Senator John 
Kerry), as well as about the personal characteristics of the two candidates. Respondents were 
also asked to rate the favorability of groups including corporations, labor unions, the NRA and 
“Christian Groups.” How respondents view these different groups--often placed on distinct ends 
of ideological and partisan divide--helps demonstrate how satirical programs influence viewers’ 
feelings towards targeted out-groups as well as potential in-groups. 
Breaking away from prior empirical studies of consumers of religious media, this study 
will control for the socio-demographic characteristics that seem most associated with watching 
religious television programming. Women, those with less money and those who live in rural 
areas tend not only to be more inclined to watch religious media; these socio-demographic 
groups are also generally just more religious than society as a whole (Argue, Johnson and White 
1999; Chalfant and Heller 1991; Joshi, Hardy and Hawkins 2009; Miller and Hoffman 1995). It 
seems surprising, then, that prior studies examining the behavior or attitudes of consumers of 
religious broadcasting do not control for these characteristics. Additionally, it should hardly be 
surprising that the more religious segments of society are more likely to watch religious 
broadcasting than the less religious members of society. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
religiosity in the GSS dataset is measured via an additive variable consisting of how often the 
respondent prays and whether the respondent believes the Bible to be the literal word of God. 
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Results: Religious Television 
Using logit models and data from the GSS circa 1988-1991 and 199830, a series of tests 
were conducted. The dependent variable in each of the models were questions from the GSS 
related to respondents’ views towards atheists, homosexuals and Communists.  This chapter will 
focus upon the models pertaining to homosexuals. This is both due to the strong support in the 
literature for believing homosexuals to be frequent foils for hosts of religious programs, and for 
the purposes of continuity as feelings towards homosexuals were discussed in the previous 
chapter.31 Respondents were asked whether they would want to ban books supporting 
homosexuals from their local libraries, whether they would allow a homosexual to teach at a 
college, and whether they felt homosexual should be allowed to “speak in (their) community.” It 
also had to be determined that viewers of religious broadcasts were distinct from the more 
religious segments of society, generally, as well as distinct from the sort of person whose socio-
demographic characteristics would make them likely to view religious broadcasting. Thus, 
controls were included for gender, income, size of respondent’s current place of residence 
(city/town/village/etc.), and the religiosity of the respondent. Religiosity was measured via an 
additive variable based upon how often the respondent prays and their opinion as to the literalism 
of the Bible. Controls were also included for both the political partisanship of the respondents as 
well as their political ideology. These latter two controls are in place to ensure that consumers of 
religious broadcasting are not simply members of the “Religious Right” of the Republican Party, 
self-selecting to consume televised messages that coincide with their political worldview. Tests 
                                                 
30
 These were the two panels in which respondents were asked how much time per week, in 
hours and minutes, they normally spent watching religious shows on television 
31
 While frequent viewership of religious television was not significant in effecting respondents’ 
views on whether atheists or Communists should be allowed to teach a college course, they 
remained significant in the predicted directions in the other four models. 
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were then conducted in order to see if those who consume religious media hold distinct views 
regarding specific out-groups targeted by religious television (Bruce 1990; Hughey 1990; Straub 
1988). In each model, increased viewership of religious media causes one to be more likely to 
give the answer more hostile towards homosexuals (Table 4.1).  
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Table 4.1 Logit Estimations Demonstrating the Impact of Religious Media on Views 
Towards Homosexuals 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
  Cofficient estimate (std. err.) by estimation type and dependent variable 
 
Independent 
Variable 
  
Logit 
Gays speaking 
in community 
 
Logit 
Gays teaching a 
college course 
 
Logit 
Banning a 
book in favor 
of 
homosexuality 
 
Constant  0.206 
(.510) 
0.284 
(.462) 
0.333 
(0.455) 
 
Watches 
Religious TV 
 
 –0.214 
(0.55) 
p = .0001 
 0.248 
(0.558) 
p =.0001 
 –0.224 
(0.055) 
p = .0001 
 
Income  –0.99 
(0.23)  
p = .0001 
–0.100 
(0.21)  
p = .0001 
0.044 
(0.022)  
p = .0414 
 
Sex  -0.493 
(0.140)  
p = .0004 
-0.563 
(0.126)  
p = .0001 
0.571 
(0.123)  
p = .0001 
 
Age  0.014 
(0.004)  
p = .0005 
0.020 
(0.004)  
p = .0001 
-0.015 
(0.003)  
p = .0001 
 
Urban/Rural  0.136 
(1.644)  
p = .00001 
0.117 
(0.021)  
p = .0001 
-0.083 
(0.021)  
p = .0001 
 
Religiosity  –0.292 
 (0.044)  
p = .0001 
–0.178 
 (0.036)  
p = .0001 
0.289 
 (0.037)  
p = .0001 
 
 
Political 
Ideology 
 0.150 
(0.052) 
p = .0039 
0.138 
(0.46) 
p = .0029 
-0.138 
(0.046) 
p = .0025 
 
Partisan ID  -0.036 
(0.034) 
p = .2846 
-0.019 
(0.030) 
p = .5353 
0.089 
(0.030) 
p = .0032 
 
n  1604 1588 1593  
Adj. R2  0.131 0.115 0.112  
F, χ2  214.6 220.78 219.84  
Note: 
 
 
p –values are for two-tailed tests. The χ2-statistic is shown for the Logit regression. The Adjusted R2 
shown for the Logit regression is the pseudo-R2 estimated by Stata.   
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In a slightly different vein, a regression was also run to see if increased consumption of 
religious media had a significant relationship with wanting to ban art “that mocks religion.” 
Again, even when controlling for socio-demographic characteristics and religiosity, increased 
consumption of religious broadcasting leads to increased support of banning said art. These 
findings lend support to the first two hypotheses asserted in this chapter; not only does a higher 
level of consumption of religious media lead one to hold views and beliefs distinct from 
religiously conservative members of society, Republicans and ideological conservatives, but 
these beliefs and attitudes are reflected in greater antipathy towards select out-groups. 
Hypothesis 2 was tested by way of models analyzing whether increased viewing of 
religious television coincided with increased agreement with opinions on secular matters that 
tend to find uniform agreement among Republicans. It is understood that there would likely be 
some overlap with the Religious Right. However, if we look at all consumers of religious 
broadcasting, there may be some sharp distinctions from the Religious Right. For example, 
African-Americans are more likely to consume religious broadcasting than White Americans.32 
Additionally, it is likely that even within the Religious Right, there may be a large population 
that does not consume religious broadcasting, and a smaller group that does. Additional analysis 
was conduced with this very question in mind; are frequent consumers of religious television 
simply a subset of the Religious Right, or is there a distinct effect coming from consuming the 
televised messages? This idea was tested by running logit models where it was examined 
whether watching religious television had any significant relationship with three issues 
commonly held in the Republican party: Opposition to the legalization of marijuana, opposition 
                                                 
32
 See Pew Research Center Survey April 10, 2001, http://people-press.org/report/?pageid=115 
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to gun control, and support for the death penalty.33 These are three issues where the Republican 
Party had--and remains to have--wholly clear positions (Republican Party Platform of 1988). 
Affinity for each of these issues were used as the dependent variable in a series of logit models, 
with controls for partisanship, ideology and socio-demographic criteria included, as well as 
religious television viewership. Marijuana legalization was coded as “0” for favoring legalization 
and “1” for opposition to the legalization of marijuana. Gun control was measured by a binomial 
variable wherein respondents were asked whether they supported (coded “0”) or opposed (coded 
“1”) potential gun buyers needing a police permit before they could purchase a firearm. Support 
for capital punishment was measured by a binomial variable where support for capital 
punishment was coded as “0” and opposition to capital punishment was coded “1.” 
  
                                                 
33
 Respondents were asked whether they would “favor or oppose a law which would require a 
person to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun,” “Do you think the use of 
marijuana should be made legal or not” and “Are you in favor of the death penalty for persons 
convicted of murder”. For each question, respondents were given a choice of “Yes,” “No” or 
“Don’t Know”. 
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Table 4.2 Logit Estimations Demonstrating the Impact of Religious Media on Views 
Towards Republican Platform Positions 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
  Cofficient estimate (std. err.) by estimation type and dependent variable 
 
Independent 
Variable 
  
Logit 
Support gun 
buyers needing 
police permits 
 
Logit 
Favor or oppose 
the death penalty 
 
Logit 
Favor or 
oppose 
legalization of 
marijuana 
 
Constant  0.849 
(.497) 
-0.980 
(.385) 
0.670 
(0.489) 
 
Watches 
Religious TV 
  .011 
(0.062) 
p = .8572 
 0.116 
(0.045) 
p =.0105 
 .065 
(0.076) 
p = .3898 
 
Income  –0.029 
(0.024)  
p = .2340 
–0.049 
(0.018) 
p = .0058 
0.014 
(0.025)  
p = .5755 
 
Sex  -.851 
(0.133)  
p = .0001 
0.252 
(0.104)  
p = .0151 
0.327 
(0.130)  
p = .0124 
 
Age  -0.003 
(0.004)  
p = .4009 
-0.003 
(0.003)  
p = .2543 
.011 
(0.004)  
p = .0040 
 
Urban/Rural  0.117 
(0.023)  
p = .00001 
-0.044 
(0.018)  
p = .0164 
.113 
(0.025)  
p = .0001 
 
Religiosity  –0.018 
 (0.038)  
p = .6384 
–0.102 
 (0.03)  
p = .0006 
-0.208 
 (0.040)  
p = .0001 
 
 
Political 
Ideology 
 0.130 
(0.051) 
p = .0102 
-0.218 
(0.039) 
p = .0001 
0.322 
(0.050) 
p = .0001 
 
Partisan ID  0.080 
(0.033) 
p = .0147 
-0.126 
(0.026) 
p = .0001 
-0.020 
(0.034) 
p = .5687 
 
n  1606 2300 1573  
Adj. R2  0.0624 0.0552 0.0992  
F, χ2  102.11 144.63 171.61  
Note: 
 
 
p –values are for two-tailed tests. The χ2-statistic is shown for the Logit regression. The Adjusted R2 
shown for the Logit regression is the pseudo-R2 estimated by Stata.   
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Increased viewing of religious television has no statistically significant relationship with 
views on the legalization of marijuana or gun control (Table 4.2). Running contrary to the 
standard Republican--and conservative--position of the day, viewing religious television 
programming is found to be significantly correlated with opposition to the death penalty (Table 
4.2). These results lend support for the assertion that consumers of religious television are not 
simply Republicans with peculiar television viewing habits; rather, consumers of religious 
broadcasts are a distinct group of the American populace. There is a distinct effect of viewing 
religious television broadcasts. 
Results: Satirical Television  
Running a series of linear regressions on Annenberg data from 2004, greater viewership 
of late night comedies was found to be significantly correlated with being male, young, having a 
lower level of income Democratic partisan affiliation, living in an urban area, possessing a 
liberal ideology, decreased church attendance and increased levels of education. Race was not 
found to be significantly correlated with higher levels of watching late night talk shows. These 
results are not altogether surprising, considering how the literature has repeatedly found that 
satirical programming is the province of the young, “hip” educated urbanite (Baumgartner and 
Morris 2006; Cantor 1999; Cao 2008; Carr 1992; Fox and Sahin 2007; Hart and Hartelius 2007; 
Holbert et al. 2007; Hollander 2005; LaMarre et al. 2009; Young and Esralew 2011). Additional 
linear regressions that controlled for partisan affiliation, ideology, residing in an urban location, 
income, education, church attendance, age, gender and race were run, and it was found that those 
who watched late night comedies had significantly stronger negative feelings towards President 
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George W. Bush. These models used as their dependent variables a variety of questions relating 
to President Bush’s personal qualities (See Tables 4.3 and 4.4)34.  
  
                                                 
34
 For each of the opinion questions regarding President George W. Bush and Senator John F. 
Kerry, respondents were asked to place on a scale of 0 to 10 how much they agreed with a 
provided statement. Respondents were thus asked to place, on a scale of 0 to 10, how much they 
agreed with the statement that Bush was trustworthy, knowledgeable, out of touch, arrogant, 
reckless and that President Bush “shared their values”. Similar questions were asked of 
respondents about Senator Kerry. 
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Table 4.3. OLS Results of Late Night Comedy’s Impact on Views Towards George 
W. Bush: Positive Personality Traits 
  Coefficient estimates (std. err.) by dependent variable 
Independent 
Variable  
Feelings that Bush 
is trustworthy 
Feelings that Bush shares 
respondents’ values 
Feelings that Bush 
is knowledgeable 
Constant  9.60 (0.095) 
9.841 
(0.094) 
10.158 
(0.103) 
Watching 
Late Night 
Comedy 
 
–0.046 
(0.008) 
p = .0001 
–0.045 
(0.008) 
p =.0001 
–0.106 
(0.009) 
p = .0001 
Party ID  
-3.906 
(0.033) 
p = .0001 
–4.072 
(0.033) 
p = .0001 
-3.083 
(0.036) 
p = .0001 
Ideology 
 
-0.722 
(0.016) 
p = .0001 
-0.847 
(0.016) 
p = .0001 
–0.672 
(0.017) 
p = .0001 
Income  
0.024 
(0.008) 
p = .0020 
0.036 
(0.008) 
p = .0001 
-0.032 
(0.008) 
p = .0001 
Education  
-0.085 
(0.007) 
p = .0001 
–0.084 
(0.007) 
p = .0001 
0.188 
(0.008) 
p = .0001 
Age  
0.004 
(0.0009) 
p = .0001 
–0.001 
(0.0009) 
p = .1471 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
p = .1645 
Gender  
0.083 
(0.029) 
p = .0039 
0.189 
(0.028) 
p = .0001 
0.33 
(0.031) 
p = .0001 
Race  
-0.068 
(0.017) 
p = .0001 
-0.05 
(0.017) 
p = .0036 
-0.019 
(0.019) 
p = .2983 
Urban or 
Rural  
0.154 
(0.020) 
p = .0001 
0.158 
(0.020) 
p = .0001 
0.213 
(0.022) 
p = .0001 
n 
Adj. R2 
F 
 
34,844 
0.470 
3433.63 
34,746 
.510 
4022.57 
27,531 
.405 
2086.77 
Note: p –values are for two-tailed tests. 
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Table 4.4. OLS Results of Late Night Comedy’s Impact on Views Towards George 
W. Bush: Negative Personality Traits 
  Coefficient estimates (std. err.) by dependent variable 
Independent 
Variable  
Feelings that Bush 
is out of touch 
Feelings that Bush is 
reckless 
Feelings that Bush 
is arrogant 
Constant  1.847 (0.153) 
1.355 
(0.124) 
1.775 
(0.152) 
Watching 
Late Night 
Comedy 
 
0.054 
(0.014) 
p = .0001 
0.54 
(0.011) 
p = .0001 
0.066 
(0.014) 
p = .0001 
Party ID  
2.308 
(0.054) 
p = .0001 
2.584 
(0.044) 
p = .0001 
2.767 
(0.054) 
p = .0001 
Ideology  
0.711 
(0.026) 
p = .0001 
0.662 
(0.021) 
p = .0001 
0.691 
(0.26) 
p = .0001 
Income  
-0.04 
(0.126) 
p = .0016 
-0.02 
(0.010) 
p = .0524 
0.012 
(0.013) 
p = .3524 
Education  
0.073 
(0.011) 
p = .0001 
0.100 
(0.009) 
p = .0001 
0.107 
(0.011) 
p = .0001 
Age  
-0.002 
(0.001) 
p = .1676 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
p = .0040 
-0.004 
(0.001) 
p = .0050 
Gender  
-0.109 
(0.046) 
p = .0193 
-0.316 
(0.038) 
p = .0001 
-0.356 
(0.046) 
p = .0001 
Race  
-0.036 
(0.028) 
p = .2077 
0.027 
(0.023) 
p = .2301 
-0.043 
(0.028) 
p = .1285 
Urban or 
Rural  
-0.065 
(0.032) 
p = .0455 
-0.088 
(0.026) 
p = .0008 
-0.051 
(0.032) 
p = .1164 
n 
Adj. R2 
F 
 
21,312 
.209 
626.30 
27,488 
.260 
1067.82 
19,191 
.269 
786.80 
Note: p –values are for two-tailed tests. 
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 It should be noted that viewership of late night comedies remained significant in each of 
these models, even as variables known to affect one’s political opinions--such as race, income 
and residing in an urban location--would drop out of significance during some of the tests. 
Frequent viewership of late night talk shows was also significantly correlated with negative 
views of “Christian groups,” even when all of the controls in the previous six models were 
included in the model. The consumption of satirical media did not have a statistically significant 
impact on viewers’ feelings towards corporations, though it did run in the predicted, negative 
direction. 
In a deviation from the hypotheses, it was found that viewing late night talk shows was 
significantly related with positive views towards 2004 Democratic Party Presidential candidate, 
Senator John F. Kerry of Massachusetts. Exposure to late night talk shows was found to have a 
significant positive relationship with views towards Senator Kerry’s knowledge, trust in Senator 
Kerry and a belief that Senator John Kerry shared their values. These findings would seem to 
counter the contention proffered in this dissertation that, while television can increase negative 
feelings towards out-groups held up for ridicule, it is not likely to engender similar positive 
feelings towards in groups likely to be simpatico with the viewing audience. However, there are 
questionable results in looking for a similar relationship between viewing late night comedic talk 
shows and social groups that can be seen as liberal. Watching late night comedic talks shows was 
not found to be significant in a series of models where the dependent variables were feelings 
towards labor unions, environmental groups and Congressional Democrats35, respectively. 
                                                 
35
 For each of the “group favorability” questions, respondents were asked to place the group on a 
scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest possible score. When asked about Congressional 
Democrats, however, respondents were asked whether they “strongly approved,” “somewhat 
approved,” “somewhat disapproved” or “strongly disapproved” of how the Democrats in 
Congress were performing. As such, this variable is an ordinal variable that runs from 1 to 4. 
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However, increased viewership of late night comedic talk shows was significantly correlated 
with warmer feelings towards homosexual groups and feminist groups. These findings warrant a 
revisiting of the Baum (2005) piece that was distinguished from this dissertation in an earlier 
chapter. 
 One of the points raised in Baum (2005) was that candidates for political office appear 
on talk shows in order to show their more “human” side, and subsequently curry favor with the 
public. Senator John Kerry appeared on The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, The Daily Show with 
John Stewart and The Late Show with David Letterman during the campaign season. President 
George W. Bush appeared on none of the above-mentioned programs, or any other comedic late 
night talk shows, during the 2004 campaign season.36 It is thus possible that, even in the conflict-
driven, negative world of television, personal appearances by a public figure can neutralize the 
otherwise negative vitriol that is broadcast over the airwaves. 
As was mentioned earlier in this dissertation, there was been a recent spate of research 
centered on The Daily Show (Baumgartner and Morris 2006; Fox et al. 2007; Holbert et al. 2007; 
LaMarre et al. 2009; Landreville, Holbert and LaMarre 2010; Moy et al. 2005, 2006; Young 
2004; Young and Tisinger 2006). In light of this interest in The Daily Show, the effects of this 
program in particular warrant consideration. Some might even argue that while Jon Stewart’s 
program is political, the other talk shows included in this dataset (The Tonight Show with Jay 
Leno, Late Night with Conan O’Brien, The Late Show with David Letterman and  “Other”) are 
                                                 
36
 President Bush’s press secretary, Dana Perino, stated that President Bush, liked and respected 
the late night comedy programs, but he never went on them. “President Bush didn’t go on until 
after the presidency was over,” said Perino. “He just didn’t think it was a place where the 
president should be. And also, they’re dangerous” (Rothman 2012). However, then-candidate for 
president Governor George W. Bush appeared on The Tonight Show with Jay Leno in 2000 
(Feldman 2012).  
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not political.  The question to be addressed is: is Stewart’s program driving the appearance that 
late night comedic talk shows cause negative opinions of conservative figures and groups? While 
this does not appear to necessarily be the case, The Daily Show does have some singular affects. 
The question on viewing late night talk shows was used to generate different dummy variables; 
one where viewing Stewart’s show was coded “1” and viewership of any of the other listed 
programs (Leno’s program, O’Brien’s, Letterman’s and “other) was coded “0.” Similar variables 
were created for each of the other programs, plus “other.”  For each of these models, “other” was 
not included. Controls for partisan affiliation, ideology, age, income, urbanity, education, gender 
and race were included in each of the models. All of the tables presenting the results of these 
models can be found in the appendix of this dissertation. 
When analyzing each of the late night talk shows individually, it is found that only The 
Daily Show remains significant in the predicted direction in thinking that President Bush does 
not share the same values as the viewer. Similar results are produced when analyzing the impact 
of late night talk shows on feelings towards the National Rifle Association (NRA). While there is 
no statistically significant relationship between watching late night talk shows and feelings 
towards the NRA when the looking at each of the programs individually, there is a negative, 
statistically significant relationship between viewing The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and 
feelings towards the NRA; none of the other talk shows produced a significant result. Similarly, 
when the dependent variable is the respondents’ agreement with the statement that President 
George W. Bush is trustworthy, Stewart’s program has a significant relationship and runs in the 
predicted direction . Viewing The Daily Show was found to be significantly, positively correlated 
with feeling that President George W. Bush is “reckless”. However, Viewership of The Daily 
Show was not significantly correlated with negative feelings towards “Christian Groups,” despite 
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the finding that viewing late night satirical talk shows was significantly related to negative 
feelings towards these groups. 
Conclusion 
 Experimental designs are said to be high in internal validity, but low in external validity. 
As a way of adding to the external validity and generalizability of the results presented in the last 
chapter, large-n cross-sectional data culled from nationally conducted surveys was tested with a 
variety of OLS and ordered logit models. The results of these tests largely support the hypotheses 
presented at the beginning of the chapter. Increased viewership of non-news programs that 
contain political messages--in this case, religious television and satirical television--leads to 
increased antipathy towards the societal out-groups presented for scorn or ridicule during the 
broadcasts. Even among the segments of society likely to view religious television, analysis of 
GSS data demonstrated a statistically significant relationship between increased viewership of 
religious television and antipathy towards homosexuals. It was also demonstrated that consumers 
of religious television are not simply socially conservative, Christian members of the Republican 
Party, as there was no significant relationship between viewing religious television and support 
for various platforms of the Republican Party’s presidential platform. 
Analysis of the NAES datasets demonstrating statistically significant relationships 
between increased viewership of comedic late night comedy programs and negative feelings 
towards a variety of conservative public figures and groups. These results were determined when 
controlling for not only partisanship and ideology, but also the socio-demographic characteristics 
that make one likely to view satirical programming. Tests demonstrated mixed results in showing 
a relationship between viewership of satirical programs and increased positive feelings towards 
liberal and Democratic groups and figures. It appears that Baum (2005) may warrant further 
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consideration, as appearances by a public figure on a non-news program may cause the viewing 
public to feel more favorably towards that figure. 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
 
Political scientists, as well as other social scientists, have produced a thorough canon of 
scholarship exploring the impact that political advertisements, nightly and cable news, and 
campaign coverage can have on the audience. The motivation behind writing this dissertation 
was to address the impact that non-news programs, the vast majority of what is shown on 
television, have upon television viewers. If non-news programs are influencing the political 
views of millions of television viewers, it would behoove political scientists to study how and in 
what manner these views are being manipulated.  
As was stated at the beginning of this dissertation, at the core of this research are the 
assertions that media effects are real and the role that non-news programs play in influencing 
their viewers warrants empirical examination.  The research presented in the preceding chapters 
has helped demonstrate both of these assertions. Hypotheses based on the above assertions were 
tested through the use of an experimental design and the analysis of large-n cross-sectional data. 
Both iterations have shown that exposure to non-news programming that contains political 
messages leads to viewers’ increased antipathy towards the social out-groups targeted for scorn 
or ridicule in those programs. Due to the divisive, conflict-laden version of reality presented by 
television, it was not expected that non-news programs containing political messages would lead 
to greater warmth toward the groups presenting the messages. This hypothesis was further 
informed by the power of affect in the decision making process, particularly the importance that 
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negative emotional reactions have in influencing how people feel towards certain people or 
ideas. This hypothesis was supported by the findings in chapters three and four.   
Chapter Three presents intriguing evidence of the impact that non-news programs can 
have on a viewing audience. The results of the experiment also provide strong support for the 
argument that the effect of non-news programs is not merely a symptom of “self-selection.” It is 
acknowledged that the design dealt with a fairly small sample size, roughly 175 respondents. The 
sample was also disproportionately Democratic, which could have impacted some of the findings 
and may have somewhat weakened the generalizability of the findings. The partisan skew may 
also have been a reason for the unexpected results. 
 Future research could help explore some of the unexpected results of the experimental 
design.  Exposure to the religious media treatment resulted in significantly more negative 
feelings towards homosexuals and gay marriage and no resulting increased empathy for Christian 
conservatives or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. These results support the 
hypotheses made in chapter three. As religious television targets certain social groups in 
describing a “righteous we vs. sinful others” view of the world (Bruce 1990; Hughey 1990; 
Straub 1988), exposure to these messages will then cause viewers to view the “others,” or out-
groups, with disdain. However, due to the divisive, critical nature of television, viewers are not 
expected to also rally around the “we” to whom religious television alludes (McLuhan 1964; 
Dahl 1967 Robinson 1976). When the respondents were then divided by political party, it was 
revealed that exposure to the treatment had no statistically significant impact on Republican 
respondents, but caused a significant decline in positive feelings towards homosexuals and gay 
marriage among Democrats. 
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 Democratic respondents’ statistically significantly lower feelings towards homosexuals 
and gay marriage after viewing the religious media treatment raises many questions that warrant 
additional study. Are Democrats more likely than Republicans to have their minds changed by 
what they see on television? Is Robertson simply a highly persuasive and effective figure? Is the 
purpose of televangelism--harkening back to its revival tent roots--to win new converts, while 
other forms of non-news programs with political messaging are geared more towards “preaching 
to the choir?”  Is there a kind of “saturation point” whereby ones opinions are crystallized to the 
point where new information--even information with which they agree--will not cause any real 
change in opinion (Campbell et al. 1960; Zaller 1992; 1993)? Future studies could also explore 
whether there is also a “backlash” effect of being exposed to visual materials that contradict a 
viewers’ previously held beliefs or mock groups or figures to whom a viewer feels positively. 
While the results were not statistically significant--possibly due to the small sample size of 
Republicans--Republicans who were exposed to the satirical treatment became more fond of 
Mormons and conservative Christians than those who were not exposed to the treatment. This 
result may also have been due to the timing of the experimental design and the political 
landscape in the fall of 2012. Republican Presidential Candidate Mitt Romney is a Mormon, and 
his religion was on display during his presidential campaign. Republican respondents may have 
seen the jibes at the Mormon faith as being subtle jokes at their preferred candidate’s expense.  
The analysis of the cross-sectional data in Chapter Four presents evidence that even 
among the sub-sets of the American population who view religious and satirical media, there are 
distinct effects of consuming those messages. Viewers of both religious and satirical programs 
are more likely to hold negative feelings towards the figures and members of society typically 
targeted for ridicule and derision in those programs. The results of the National Annenberg 
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Election Survey (NAES) data presents some mixed results in terms of whether consuming 
satirical media leads to increased warmth towards liberal public figures. It is possible that 
making appearances on late night comedic talk shows, as Senator Kerry did in 2004, mitigates 
the flow of otherwise negative, “snarky” messages from those television programs. Future 
research projects could explore this possibility more fully.  
This dissertation could lead to further empirical evaluations of how televised 
entertainment can mold audiences’ views towards certain segments of society. While this 
dissertation only explores two case studies, religious and satirical media, numerous other 
television program formats warrant examination. As mentioned earlier in the dissertation, there is 
scant empirical examination of television sitcoms. Popular and ubiquitous formats, such as crime 
drama/police procedurals, have also been known to offer commentary on topical political issues. 
The long-running program Law & Order, which also spawned a series of successful and popular 
spin-off programs such as Law & Order: SVU, often interwove real-life events into the drama by 
basing plots on real life crime or issues that are “ripped from the headlines” (Conroy 2009; Farhi 
2009). The impact that entertainment programs such as Law & Order have on the audience’s 
views of different political issues may be significant; conservative pundits and bloggers alike 
have long chronicled a supposed liberal slant to the Law & Order franchise (Edroso 2010). If this 
popular series did consistently frame issues in a partisan manner, how did this influence the 
audience? The police procedural format is not an obvious vehicle for delivering political 
messages, but may nonetheless warrant examination. If Law & Order was able to broadcast 
political messages in the context of a police program for roughly two decades, what other 
seemingly innocuous television formats are also presenting political messages? 
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Future scholars could also modify the experimental design in order to address questions 
that this dissertation largely left alone. Television viewers do not watch their preferred programs 
in one-time, three-minute bursts. Rather, favorite programs are watched routinely over the course 
of months or even years. As such, the opinions and outlooks of the television audience are not 
being molded due to one-dose treatments, but subtly molded over time. Being able to repeatedly 
expose a panel of respondents to treatments over a fixed period of time would allow a researcher 
to examine whether there is a change in outlooks or opinions when respondents receive more 
than a brief, single treatment. Future studies could also try to incorporate the idea of “media 
choice” into the experimental design. In the real world, television viewers have the option of 
watching a single program or “grazing” and changing from one program to the next. Being able 
to account for this behavior in the context of analyzing the impact that non-news programs can 
have on views towards targeted out-groups would add to the results of this dissertation (Forgette, 
Morris and Russo 2013). 
 Future works could also test the degree to which videomalaise plays a role in 
entertainment media’s shaping of audiences’ views. For example, do programs like Will and 
Grace serve a role in humanizing and normalizing homosexuals to a “middle America” audience, 
or do they hold up the behavior of homophobes as being distasteful? Presenting homophobes or 
those opposed to gay marriage as buffoonish or repellent could motivate audiences to adopt 
positions in favor of gay rights. The results of the experiment and analysis of the cross-sectional 
data in this dissertation indicate that television does not increase positive attitudes for groups and 
individuals in society, but can increase negative opinions of certain segments of society. It would 
be expected that comedies such as Will and Grace would not cause viewers to have positive 
feelings towards homosexuals, but could increase the antipathy one feels towards homophobes or 
92 
 
those opposed to gay marriage. The normative question of the repercussions of what it means 
that television could be used into essentially shaming the American public into tolerance--or 
towards a healthier lifestyle, or into voting more or skipping church less frequently--is one that 
may be equally at home in a televised satire such as The King of the Hill than in a journal of 
political studies. Regardless of these normative implications, ironic or otherwise, there are still 
many questions to be explored in this field.  
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In my experiment, respondents were asked to place on a 100 point feeling thermometer 
how they felt towards the two major party candidates for president in 2012; President Barack 
Obama and Governor Mitt Romney, whether they considered themselves “a liberal, a 
conservative or somewhere in between” (with options available for “very liberal/conservative,” 
liberal/conservative, and “slightly liberal/conservative”), 5 questions pertaining to their political 
knowledge (name of the Vice President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom, which party had the majority of in the House of Representatives in 2012, which 
United States institution has the responsibility for determining the constitutionality of laws and 
which of the two major parties in the United States is more conservative on the national level),  
how often they attend religious services apart from special events such as weddings and funerals, 
whether they consider themselves Republican, Democratic or Independent (if Independent, 
whether they “lean” to one of the two major parties, if they consider themselves a member of one 
of the two major parties, whether they were “strong” or “weak”),  whether they consider their 
permanent place of residence as urban/suburban/small town or rural, whether they believe the 
Bible to be the literal Word of God, to be inspired by God, or to be a book of legends and fables, 
how many hours a week they watched TV news programs, religious television programs such as 
“Praise the Lord” and “The 700 Club” and how many hours a week they watched late night 
comedic talk shows such as “The Daily Show with Jon Stewart” or “Late Night with David 
Letterman,” their age, whether or not they were still dependents of their parents, their total 
household income the previous year, which state (or nation) they were from, and  their race. 
After then being exposed to one of three video clips (Pat Robertson discussing California’s 
Proposition 8, Jon Stewart discussing California’s Proposition 8 or a local news channel’s 
coverage of Proposition 8, respondents were then asked to place on scale that ran from “Strongly 
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Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” whether they felt that marriages between same-sex couples 
should be recognized by the law as valid, with the same rights as traditional marriages. The 
survey ended with feeling thermometers, as respondents were then given 100-point feeling 
thermometers asking them to indicate their feelings towards the media, the Church of Latter-Day 
Saints, Homosexuals, Conservative Christians and Atheists37, and then their feelings as to 
Liberals, Conservatives, The Republican Party and The Democratic Party.38 
 
 
As part of a research project we are conducting a brief survey.  We ask that you answer the following 
questions, watch the enclosed video clip, and then answer another series of questions. The entire survey 
should take no more than 10 minutes. Your participation is entirely voluntary, and would be greatly 
appreciated.  Your responses are wholly anonymous.   
 
1. On a scale of 0-100, how do you feel about each of the presidential candidates? The higher the number, 
the more favorable you feel towards the candidate. The lower the number, the less favorable you feel towards 
him. A score of 50 should indicate that you feel neither favorably nor unfavorably towards that candidate. 
Please set the bar to the number that best corresponds to your feelings. 
 
(0-100 scale “Feelings Towards President Barack Obama”) 
(0-100 scale “Feelings Towards Governor Mitt Romney”) 
 
2. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a liberal, a conservative, or somewhere in between? 
-Very Liberal 
-Liberal 
-Slightly Liberal 
-Moderate, Middle of  the Road 
-Slightly Conservative 
-Conservative 
-Very Conservative 
 
3. Who is the current Vice President of the United States 
-John Roberts 
-Joseph Biden 
-Rick Perry 
-Harry Reid 
-Sarah Palin 
-Don’t Know 
 
                                                 
37
 The order of these categories were randomized for each respondent 
38
 The order of these categories were randomized for each respondent 
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4. Who is the current Prime Minister of the United Kingdom? 
-David Cameron 
-Stephen Harper 
-Tony Blair 
-Nicolas Sarkozy 
-Don’t Know 
 
5. Which political party currently has a majority in the United States House of Representatives? 
-The Democratic Party 
-The Republican Party 
-The Tea Party 
-No political party has a majority in the United States House of Representatives 
-Don’t Know 
 
6. Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not? 
-The President of the United States 
-The United States Senate 
-The United States House of Representatives 
-The Supreme Court of the United States 
-Don’t Know 
 
7. Would you say one party is more conservative than the other at the national level? If so, which one? 
-The Democratic Party 
-The Republican Party 
-Don’t Know 
 
8. How often do you attend religious services, apart from special events like weddings and funerals-more 
than once a week, once a week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never? 
-More than once a week 
-Once a week 
-Once or twice a month 
-Few times a year 
-Never 
-Don’t Know 
 
9. Do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican or an Independent? 
-Republican 
-Democrat 
-Independent 
 
10. (If Republican is selected) Would you describe yourself as strongly Republican, or not very strongly 
Republican? 
-Strong Republican 
-Weak Republican 
 
10. (If Democrat is selected) Would you describe yourself as strongly Democratic, or not very strongly 
Democratic? 
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-Strong Democrat 
-Weak Democrat 
 
10. (If Independent is selected) Do you think of yourself as being closer to the Republican or Democratic 
Party, or neither? 
-Independent/Leans Democratic 
-Independent 
-Independent/Leans Republican 
 
11. Would you describe your permanent place of residence as urban, suburban or rural? 
-Urban 
-Suburban 
-Small Town 
-Rural 
 
12. Which of these statements come closest in describing your feelings about the Bible? 
-The Bible is the actual word of God, and is meant to be taken literally, word for word 
-The Bible is the inspired word of God, but not everything in it should be taken literally, word 
for word 
-The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history and moral precepts recorded by man 
-Don’t Know 
 
13. For each of the following types of television program, please indicate how many hours per week you 
spend watching them. 
(Scale of 0-10) Television news programs 
(Scale of 0-10) Religious television programs, such as “Praise the Lord” or “The 700 Club” 
(Scale of 0-10) Late night comedic talk shows such as “The Daily Show with Jon Stewart” or 
“Late Night with David Letterman” 
 
14. What is your age? 
 
15. Are you still a dependent of your parents? 
-Yes 
-No 
 
16. (If Yes) By your best estimate, what was the total income of your parents/guardians last year, before 
taxes? 
-Less than $10,000 
-$10,000-$15,000 
-$15,000-$25,000 
-$25,000-$35,000 
-$35,000-$50,000 
-$50,000-$75,000 
-$75,000-$100,000 
-$100,000-$150,000 
-More than $150,000 
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16. (If No) By your best estimate, what was your total household income last year before taxes? 
-Less than $10,000 
-$10,000-$15,000 
-$15,000-$25,000 
-$25,000-$35,000 
-$35,000-$50,000 
-$50,000-$75,000 
-$75,000-$100,000 
-$100,000-$150,000 
-More than $150,000 
 
17. What is your gender? 
-Male 
-Female 
 
18. Which state are you from? (If you are from outside the United States, please state your country of origin) 
 
19. What is your race? 
-White/Non-Hispanic 
-African-American 
-Hispanic 
-Asian 
-Other (fill in blank) 
 
20. The text provided with each of the three video clips: Please watch the above clip before 
proceeding to the next part of the questionnaire. Hit the Play button in the lower left-hand corner of the video 
screen. Please be patient, as the clip may take a minute or two to load. Please watch the whole clip before 
clicking the button below to proceed. 
 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement.  Check only one response. 
21. Marriages between same-sex couples should be recognized by the law as valid, with the same rights as 
traditional marriages. 
-Strongly Disagree 
-Disagree 
-Neither Agree nor Disagree 
-Agree 
-Strongly Agree 
 
22. On a scale of 0 to 100, please indicate how you feel about each of the following groups. The higher the 
number, the more favorable you feel towards that group. The lower the number, the less favorable you feel 
towards them. A score of 50 should indicate that you feel neither favorably nor unfavorably towards the 
selected group. Please set the bar to the number that best corresponds to your feelings. 
(Scale 0-100) The Church of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) 
(Scale 0-100) Homosexuals 
(Scale 0-100) Atheists 
(Scale 0-100) Conservative Christians 
(Scale 0-100) The media 
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23. On a scale of 0 to 100, please indicate how you feel about each of the following groups. The higher the 
number, the more favorable you feel towards that group. The lower the number, the less favorable you feel 
towards them. A score of 50 should indicate that you feel neither favorably nor unfavorably towards the 
selected group. Please set the bar to the number that best corresponds to your feelings. 
(Scale 0-100) Liberals 
(Scale 0-100) Conservatives 
(Scale 0-100) The Republican Party 
(Scale 0-100) The Democratic Party 
 
Thank you very much for your participation in our survey. In accordance with University of 
Mississippi  guidelines, we would like to assure you that your participation will be kept anonymous. If you 
are interested in the results of this survey, you may contact Mr. Salvatore Russo at sjrusso@go.olemiss.edu 
Your code for completing this survey   
(Respondent was then provided with a randomly generated code) 
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